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PREMODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM
MARTIN H. REDISH* & MATTHEW HEINS**
ABSTRACT
The traditional concept of American constitutionalism has long
been a basic assumption not subject to tremendous examination. For
generations, scholars have understood our Constitution to be the
byproduct of a revolutionary war fought for representation and a
foundinggeneration concerned with preventingtyranny in any form.
The traditional understandingof American constitutionalism thus
consists of two elements: the underlyingprinciple of skeptical opti-
mism, which can be found in the historical context within which the
Framers gathered to draft the Constitution, and the political ap-
paratus effectuating that idea countermajoritarian constraint set
against majoritarian power which reveals itself through reverse
engineeringfrom the structural Constitution.
Over the last few decades, two sets of modernist scholars have
attacked the activatingdevices that deploy the traditional vision of
American constitutionalism. Constitutional realists do not claim
to dispute the animating purpose of American constitutional gov-
ernance, but they claim that the complete American Constitution is
represented by more than just the entrenched written document.
Departmentalists and popular constitutionalists also claim to ac-
cept the animatingpurpose of American constitutionalism, but they
also claim that the written Constitution forbids judicial supremacy,
or at least that it is neither constitutionally required nor normatively
desirable.
* Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern University
School of Law.
** B.A. 2009, University of Southern California; J.D. 2015, Northwestern University
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Neither group acknowledges the other, presumably because they
assume they are attackingentirely different aspects of our constitu-
tional structure. But by exposingthe fundamental flaws of these two
theories and how they irremediably contradict the underlyingprin-
ciple and apparatus, this Article shows modernist attacks on the two
primary activating devices of our constitutional government the
singular written document and its prophylactic, insulated judicial
interpreter are attacks on American constitutionalism itself. We
therefore develop a more complete, revamped theoretical explanation
of traditional constitutionalism that incorporates this understand-
ing. Premodern constitutionalism understands that the core of
American constitutionalism has a tripartite theoretical foundation.
It is the principle of skeptical optimism as well as the political
apparatus of countermajoritarian constraint of majoritarian power
structures, which implements the principle. And it is the two key
structural elements necessary to activate the political apparatus
an entrenched written constitution and a prophylactic, insulated ju-
diciary empowered to interpret it.
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INTRODUCTION
When we embark on the task of answering constitutional
questions or teaching constitutional law, most of us start from the
sensible position that our Constitution is interpretable positive law
whose dictates must be respected. This requires us to accept three
basic premises: first, that the written document is our supreme
positive law; second, that the judiciary is empowered to interpret it;
and third, that the judiciarys interpretation represents the final
word as to its meaning. We must start from here; otherwise, there
would be no purpose to engaging in the study of our founding docu-
ment and the rules of governmental ordering that it sets forth, nor
could we place any faith in the study of Supreme Court case law
defining and demarcating the boundaries of federal power contained
within our Constitution. Upon this foundation, we have built entire
worlds of doctrine and constitutional theory.
It may come as something of a surprise, then, that a number of
highly respected constitutional scholars have, in recent years,
sought to undermine these premises.1 We call these scholars mod-
ernists because they remind us of the architectural modernists who
defiantly spurned tradition in favor of nakedand aesthetically
displeasingfunctionalism in the early twentieth century.2 Archi-
tectural modernism was known for its determined rejection of
history and tradition, free from the idealization and imitation of
1. See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 3-4 (2014)
(asserting that the American people have amended the Constitution by popular movement
(outside of Article V) numerous times, and that the Constitution is more than merely the
document itself); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J.
408, 454 (2007) (arguing that there exists an extracanonical Constitution in the United
States); see also, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTION-
ALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 246-48 (2004) (arguing that the Constitution does not necessarily
vest the judiciary with interpretive authority, and that because the judiciary is an undemo-
cratic institution, interpretive power should be transferred to the people); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J.
217, 228-29, 240 (1994) (claiming that the coordinacy of the three branches of government
envisioned by the Framers and enshrined in the Constitution forbids judicial supremacy and
allows the executive to exercise final interpretive power).
2. See Steven C. Bourassa, Postmodernism in Architecture and Planning: What Kind of
Style?, 6 J. ARCHITECTURAL & PLAN. RES. 289, 294 (1989).
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some past era.3 It disclaimed ornamentation and symbolism, which
for centuries had been rightly understood as central to architec-
tures identity as a practice of aesthetica practical and necessary
craft of urban design that was also, at its roots, steeped in artistry.4
Similarly, two sets of modernist constitutional commentators
have proposed theories that reject the long-accepted tradition of
American constitutionalism on the basis of different forms of naked
functionalism. In one camp, self-described constitutional realists
have variously claimed different positions on one basic assertion:
that constitutions are composed of those laws, norms, and practices
that principally define the relationship between the people and their
government and set forth a nation-states power structure. As such,
they argue, the American Constitution is simultaneously more and
less than the piece of parchment upon which the Framers scribed
our supreme law in the late eighteenth century. It is less, insofar as
some provisions of the Constitution are neither respected nor closely
followed, and have thus been effectively written out of the Constitu-
tion by oversight or indignity. It is more, insofar as other laws and
movementspowerful and meaningful ones that the American pub-
lic views as fundamental to our relationship with our government,
but have never been codified in the documentare nonetheless ap-
propriately deemed to possess constitutional status. Surely no one
can dispute, for example, that on a purely practical level the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 has had a more profound impact on social and
governmental ordering in the United States than, say, the Third
Amendment5 or the Emoluments Clause.6
Also in the contrarian modernist camp are those scholars who,
while not denying the unique supremacy of the Constitution, nev-
ertheless challenge the premise that our constitutional regime
3. Id. at 293; see Jürgen Habermas, Modernity Versus Postmodernity, 22 NEW GERMAN
CRITIQUE 3, 3-4 (1981).
4. See Robert Maxwell, Modern Architecture After Modernism, 1 ANY: ARCHITECTURE
N.Y. 36, 36-37 (1993).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. III (No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by
law.).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United
States: and no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the
Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind
whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.).
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provides for a judiciary that is uniquely empowered and specially
equipped to serve as the final arbiter of constitutional interpreta-
tion. Whether by legal or originalist argument,7 or by observational
or normative means,8 these departmentalists and popular consti-
tutionalists contend that the constitutional democracy the Framers
devised was not built to support effective, enforceable judicial re-
view. Departmentalists make the descriptive originalist argument
that the Constitution envisioned all three branches as possessing
equivalent power, and that allowing the judiciarys interpretation
of the Constitution to bind the other two branches upsets the
balance of coequal power.9 Popular constitutionalists, on the other
hand, make the normative argument that judicial supremacy is
deleterious to the democratic vision of American constitutionalism.10
Observing that judicial review and supremacy were not explicitly
provided for in the Constitution, and that courts often act in concert
with majority views despite their freedom from democratic over-
sight, these scholars understand our constitutional system to accept
majoritarian authority over constitutional meaning and enforce-
ment.11
This is uncharted territory to be sure; constitutional realists,
departmentalists, and popular constitutionalists are nothing if not
innovative. But there is, we believe, a reason that this territory has
remained uncharted for so long: those who would depart from the
premises that have long served to undergird American constitu-
tional law fundamentally misunderstand the unique virtues of
American constitutionalism. Our Constitution was specially de-
signed with an eye toward protecting the American people against
tyranny in all its possible forms, including majoritarianism.
Theories that either obscure the nature of the Constitution or
misunderstand its structural guarantee undermine Americas most
meaningful and significant contribution to political theory. This
Article urges a return to a sort of traditionalism that uniquely
7. See Paulsen, supra note 1, at 227; see also infra Part II.
8. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTI-
TUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 9, 12-13 (2006); MARK
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 26 (1999); infra Part II.
9. See infra Part II.B.1.
10. See infra Part II.B.2.
11. See infra Part II.B.2.
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understands that our Constitution (1) was written down, (2) in a
single place, (3) to enshrine a constitutional democracy that would
effectively balance our competing interests in celebrating majority
interests with the need to protect minority rights.
The traditionalist view of American constitutionalism, however,
was a premise rather than a reasoned conclusion. Literature expli-
cating the traditionalist view is sparse because it has always gone
without saying that our Constitution was ... well, our Constitution.
But if we are to ask the question, What is the American Constitu-
tion?, we will find the answer by examining how our Constitution
came to be, and why the government was formed in the way that it
was formed. What were the Constitutions causes, and what were its
aims?
This ought not be an originalist inquiry, in which we seek to
discern original intent or original meaning purely by way of ex-
cavation and historical research. An originalist inquiry inherently
gives rise to often insurmountable archaeological difficulties and
requires a different kind of scholarly methodology than is consistent
with our lawyerly training.12 The historical origins of our constitu-
tional system lend some clarity in defining the borders of our con-
stitutional framework, but simple reverse engineering does more of
the theoretical work. Traditionalist theory glances at the broad,
animating purpose of the Constitution and concludes, based on an
assessment of the documents historical context and structural de-
sign elements, that the American method is a very particular type
of constitutionalism, uniquely defined by its countermajoritarian-
ism.13
12. See Martin H. Redish & Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional Inter-
pretation, and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a Controlled Activism Alternative, 64
FLA.L.REV. 1485,1491,1495 (2012) (expounding upon the variety of archaeological difficulties
that confront each type of originalist interpretation).
13. John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport have persuasively argued that the basic
character of the American Constitution is supermajoritarian. John O. McGinnis & Michael
B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX.L.REV. 703,710 (2002).Professors
McGinnis and Rappaport concern themselves mostly with explicating the value of supermajor-
itarian lawmaking and how different iterations of supermajoritarianism present themselves
in our constitutional framework. In a way, their analysis fits comfortably with our view, for
we see any lawmaking apparatus that empowers the populace but slows simple majorities as
somewhat countermajoritarian. The use of supermajoritarian elements is one method by
which our Constitution serves as a check against pure majoritarianism. Supermajoritarianism
is thus one type of countermajoritarianism, the political apparatus that we explain is central
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We call our theory premodern because it presents a defense of
the traditionalist view that probably could not have been fashioned
prior to the modernist revolution. Modernist constitutionalism
argues that American constitutionalism is not fundamentally de-
fined by a single written proclamation of the supreme positive law
of the land, one that is entrenched against majoritarian choices and
pathology by providing for a prophylactically insulated judiciary
empowered with the final say as to the documents meaning. But
both types of modernism misconceive the nature of the American
system. Our theory revives the traditionalist view, advancing its
underlying values and rejecting modernist alternatives.14 The pre-
modern view fortifies traditionalism by articulating the essence of
American constitutionalism: it explores the logical missteps at the
heart of modernist theories and the dangerous consequences that
would flow if they were accepted. Premodern constitutionalism thus
adds theoretical richness to the traditionalist model by carefully
dissecting the serious defects in the modernist attacks on tradition-
alist American constitutionalism.
The Framers made a conscious, affirmative decision to write our
Constitution down, intentionally breaking away from British tradi-
tion. Founding-era Americas rejection of the British tradition of
unwritten constitutionalism15 was truly striking, and should play
a meaningful role in forming a present-day understanding of the
American Constitution. Americas decision to break from the British
model has been hailed as the impetus for our great constitutional
revolution; many in the nineteenth century trumpeted the work of
the Founders as out-of-nowhere, momentary brilliance.16 But the
to American constitutionalism.
14. Cf. Bourassa, supra note 2, at 295 ([M]odernists indifferenceindeed hostilityto
harmonious continuity comes from the modernists violent denunciation of derivative architec-
tural forms. [Post-modern] [a]rchitects now appreciate the symbolic function of architecture
and the symbolism of historic forms and ornamentation. (quoting BRENT BROLIN, THE
FAILURE OF MODERN ARCHITECTURE 7 (1980))).
15. Here it should be noted that the British unwritten constitution is not, in fact,
unwritten. Rather, it is a collection of laws and pronouncements, like the Human Rights Act
of 1998, that the country views as elements of its constitution. See David S. Law & Mila
Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1163,
1188 (2011). Unwritten, then, signifies the absence of a single formal document.
16. Herman Belz, The Constitution in the Gilded Age: The Beginnings of Constitutional
Realism in American Scholarship, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 110, 114 (1969) (J. Franklin
Jameson, in the preface to a book of essays dealing with constitutional developments in the
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truth is that, in the words of Hermann Eduard von Holst, the Amer-
ican Constitution came to be in a manner no different from other
constitutions around the world, as a result of actual circumstances
of the past and present, and not a product of abstract political
theorizing.17 In fact, the idea of employing a single written docu-
ment has been attributed to the existence of state constitutions and
corporate charters at the time of the framing.18 The Constitution
was no empty product of political theory, but was rather a growth,
or ... a selection from a great number of growths then before the
Convention.19
The animating force behind this growth was the pervasive fear of
tyranny. The Federalist paints a picture of a Founding-era obsession
with tyranny; Hamilton and Madison saw it lurking behind every
corner and under every bed.20 Each measure the Founders took in
the course of building the new federal government was directed
toward safeguarding the nascent country and future generations of
Americans against oppression in any formtyranny of the majority,
of the minority, of the aristocracy, of the plutocracy, or of the
intellectual elite. When the Framers gathered in Philadelphia in
1787 to reconstitute the federal government, they sculpted a con-
stitutional document that would be entrenched against simple
majoritarian change, provide for checks and balances between the
branches of government, and serve as the supreme law against
which the validity of government action could be measured. The
Confederation period, stated that many educated persons think of our Constitution as having
sprung full-armed from the heads of Olympian conventioners.).
17. Id. at 113-14 (citing 1 HERMANN VON HOLST, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL HIS-
TORY OF THE UNITED STATES (John J. Lalor & Alfred B. Mason trans., Chicago, Callaghan &
Co. 1889) (1876)).
18. See Belz, supra note 16, at 114 (Explaining that the charters of English trading com-
panies were the embryo of American constitutions, [Brooks] Adams concluded, Americans are
subject to the same general laws that regulate the rest of mankind; and accordingly ... they
have worked out their destiny slowly and painfully, ... and ... far from cutting the knot of their
difficulties by a stroke of inventive genius, they earned their success by clinging tenaciously
to what they had. (quoting Brooks Adams, The Embryo of a Commonwealth, 64 ATLANTIC
MONTHLY 610 (1884))) (footnote omitted) (omissions in original).
19. Alexander Johnston, The First Century of the Constitution, 4 NEW PRINCETON REV.
175, 176-78, 186-87 (1887).
20. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 48, 49 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987);
see also McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 13, at 722 (advancing an originalist argument that
supermajoritarian governance was a uniquely American creation devised to avoid tyranny).
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written Constitution itself, and the fact of its writtenness, inescap-
ably demonstrate the Founders unique appreciation of humankinds
potential for both flourish and folly.
This is not to say that citizens of countries with unwritten
constitutionssuch as England, Israel, and New Zealandare nec-
essarily wrong to refer to their constitutions as constitutions. It is
likewise not to say that a country like China, whose constitution
does not feature countermajoritarian checking,21 has no constitution
at allthough, for reasons we will explain, both of these types of
constitutions are highly prone to charges of illegitimacy. As we will
discuss, constitutionalism as a general political philosophy is not fo-
cused on whether a constitution mirrors the American Constitution,
but rather on what methodology a country uses to create public
power structures that are legitimate according to some method of
valuation.22 In fact, the unwritten and unentrenched norms and
laws that together form the constitutions of some countries might
indeed be more legitimate than written and purportedly entrenched
sham constitutions in other countries.23
In the United States, however, the Constitution is positive law.
It does not merely set forth and structure the exercise of public
power; rather, it establishes and imposes on the polity a set of rules
and norms. Moreover, it designates enforcement mechanisms
against both its subjects and its implementers. For a nation pri-
marily concerned at the Founding with prophylactic avoidance of
tyranny in a largely heterogeneous society, the writtenness and
countermajoritarian entrenchment of the Constitution are both log-
ical and fundamental. There was real structural brilliance to the
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See infra Part I.
23. See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 863, 873-
75, 877-78 (2013); see also Larry Catá Backer, From Constitution to Constitutionalism: A
Global Framework for Legitimate Public Power Systems, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 671, 679-80
(2009) (explaining that even a written constitution is not legitimate if it cannot be positively
measured through (1) nationalist constitutionalism, which finds its values in the trans-
cendent genius of the people of the nation itself ; (2) transnational constitutionalism, which
determines a regimes legitimacy based on the community of nations expression of universal
values; (3) natural law constitutionalism, centered on universal values based on humanitys
nature or aspirations; (4) theocratic constitutionalism, whose values derive from the
imperatives of some particular religious system; or (5) rationalist constitutionalism, which
evaluates constitutional regimes according to higher order rational systems like free-market
capitalism or Leninism).
2016] PREMODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM 1835
constitutional regime that was created when our Constitution was
ratified. For Americans, the Constitution performs four vital and
overlapping functions: the document is descriptive, aspirational,
structural, and checking. The descriptive Constitution sets forth the
purposes of our constitutional regime. The structural Constitution
sets up the processes of our government. The aspirational Constitu-
tion aims to achieve certain ideals. And the checking Constitution
preserves the democratic process through the supermajoritarian
limitation on majority rule.
The prophylactically insulated judiciary is the beating heart of
the structural brilliance that defines American constitutionalism.
Indeed, once the nation chose to adopt a written, mandatory,
countermajoritarian Constitution, vesting the final say as to the
documents meaning as well as the authority to enforce its provi-
sions in the insulated judiciary became essential. This nation was
born of a revolution fought for political accountability, and yet the
Framers chose to make one of the three branches of our fledgling
national government completely insulated from public accountabil-
ity. That was no accident: only by including an entirely insulated
judicial branch could this democratic republic be protected from it-
self. Democracy inherently embodies a belief in human flourishing
and in the peoples ability to control their own destinies by partici-
pating and believing in their representative government. But by
establishing a politically unaccountable coequal judiciary branch,
the Framers acknowledged that human flourishing could not be
optimally accommodated if majorities were permitted to rule un-
checked.24 The Framers, concerned primarily with thwarting the
threat of tyranny in any form, built a Constitution that enshrined
as supreme law a uniquely American form of what we refer to as
skeptical optimismoptimism that an empowered majority could
achieve both great prosperity and personal growth, tempered by
recognition that majorities trend toward oppressing minorities. To
implement this skeptical optimism, our Constitution was structured
around the political apparatus of countermajoritarian checking of
majoritarian power. The choice to include an insulated judiciary was
a meaningful one, and that judiciarys ability to provide prophylaxis
24. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 20, at 438 (Alexander Hamilton) (The com-
plete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution.).
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was the keystone to the archway of achieving the Constitutions
devised ends. Without a countermajoritarian judiciary armed with
the power of judicial review, the entire design of our national gov-
ernment would be meaninglessor worse. Without the insulated
judiciary authoritatively interpreting the Constitution, our struc-
tural Constitution would create the appearance of countermajor-
itarian checking against majoritarian impulses that, in reality,
would amount to nothing more than illusion.
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, we describe what we
view as the traditional conception of American constitutionalism.
Traditionalism depends upon historical context to define the prin-
ciple at the core of our form of constitutionalism and depends upon
reverse engineering from the structural Constitution to pinpoint the
apparatus fundamental to converting that idea into political philos-
ophy.25 We can (and do) look to The Federalist and other early texts
to develop the traditionalist model of American constitutionalism,
but much of our explanation of traditionalism relies on straight-
forward examination of both the historical context within which the
Constitution came into existence, and the structures embedded
within it. In this way, we focus on the core principle animating our
constitutional regime without reliance on the type of archaeological
excavation required to advance an originalist argument.26 The tra-
ditionalist model of American constitutionalism, we explain, is the
common sense explanation for our structural Constitution.27 The
system designed within our unique written document can only be
explained by the notion that the core of American constitutionalism
is skeptical optimism driving the balancing of representative
governance against meaningful countermajoritarian checks de-
signed to control that government. It places the principle and the
political apparatus at the core of American constitutionalism and
25. See infra Part I.A.
26. We must strongly emphasize that we do not view traditionalism as synonymous with
originalism, nor do we believe that espousing a traditionalist view of our Constitutions ani-
mating principles necessitates originalist interpretation. But see Steven E. Sachs, Originalism
as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 817, 857 (2015). We do not rely on
the original meaning of the Constitutions text or the original intent of the Framers to dem-
onstrate that countermajoritarianism is the core element of our constitutional regime;
instead, we view the structural Constitution as itself proof positive of the countermajoritar-
ian principle at its heart. See infra Part I.
27. See infra Part I.B.
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understands the activating mechanisms of a singular written
Constitution and a prophylactically insulated judiciary as logical
outgrowths of a system built on these premises.28
In Part II, we explore the two prominent modernist attacks on
the traditional view of American constitutionalism. By modernist,
we refer to revisionist views of American constitutionalism proposed
in recent years by a number of highly respected constitutional
theorists. This Part first examines constitutional realism and its
argument that the entrenched, written Constitution does not com-
prise the totality of higher law in the United States.29 In addition to
being problematic from a practical perspective (and thus being un-
desirable from a normative standpoint), the realist argument is
theoretically indefensible. In fact, as the discussion will show, in
their efforts to recognize a realist form of constitutionalism, these
scholars haveironicallybeen wholly unrealistic because both
the American people and the courts categorically reject the consti-
tutionalization of nonconstitutional law.30 Part II will then proceed
to confront the modernist theories that challenge not whether the
written Constitution represents the full extent of our higher law,
but rather whether American constitutionalism requires, or even
permits, ultimate majoritarian enforcement and interpretation. We
will explain why departmentalists are wrong to oppose the idea that
countermajoritarian judicial supremacy is fundamental to Amer-
ican constitutionalism,31 and how popular constitutionalists err in
arguing that majorities are better suited to interpret our supreme
law.32
Part III explains the meaning of what we label premodern con-
stitutionalism. Our position is that American constitutionalism is
properly defined not only by skeptical optimism and counterma-
joritarianism, but also by the two activating mechanisms that have
come under modernist attack. The Constitution is a written docu-
ment that serves descriptive and prescriptive purposes, provides for
the mutual checking of powers among the branches, and balances
28. See infra Part I.B.
29. See infra Part II.A.
30. See infra Part II.A.
31. See infra Part II.B.1.
32. See infra Part II.B.2.
1838 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1825
the ideals of human flourishing against the evils inherent in hu-
man nature. The written document is entrenched against the
choices of temporary majorities, and the prophylactically insulated
judiciary is designed to protect constitutionally guaranteed minority
interests. Whereas historical context, common sense, and reverse
engineering form the theoretical proof-points for the traditionalist
model of American constitutionalism, the premodern model of con-
stitutionalism urges a revival of traditionalism based on a critique
of, and reaction to, the problems associated with both forms of
modernism, as well as the troubling consequences that would
inevitably flow from the adoption of either of them.
Finally, in Part IV we will demonstrate the correctness of the
premodern view of American constitutionalism by contrasting it
with foreign regimes whose constitutional models more closely align
with the precepts of modernist constitutionalism.33 This Part will
examine the handful of unwritten constitutions that realist
scholars have suggested can assist American constitutionalists in
understanding the American regime. It will also examine an
unapologetically majoritarian constitutional regime to demonstrate,
as a practical matter, why departmentalist and popular constitu-
tionalist theories are wrong to suggest that the activation devices of
a singular written constitutional document subject to formal al-
teration only through supermajoritarian process and to final
interpretation by prophylactically insulated judicial review do not
lie at the core of American constitutionalism. We will explain why
some of these foreign constitutional systems might be adequately
suited to constitute the governments of more homogeneous or less
cynical nations, but are by their very nature inconsistent with
American constitutionalism and not properly engineered to address
the American constitutional concernnamely, successfully securing
prophylactic protection against the tyranny of majorities.
Some might read this Article as a thinly veiled assertion of
American exceptionalism. In a manner of speaking, it is: we believe
that the American constitutionalism we identify was uniquely
tailored to safeguard our generative values, and that Americas
major contribution to legal and political thought is constitutional
33. See infra Part IV.
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democracy, thoughtfully engineered to ensure freedom from the
potential tyranny of unconstrained majoritarianism. This is not to
say that the insulated judiciary always checks majoritarian action
perfectly, or even effectively; indeed, the Supreme Courts actions
have all too often demonstrated that it is far from infallible and may
fail to protect minority interests against majority oppression.34 But
we argue that despite these lapses, the judiciary for the most part
does abide by our Constitution as higher law. At the very least,
unlike the executive branch, the judiciary does not threaten to im-
pose its will through sheer military force, and unlike the legislative
branch, it is not directly subject to the political pressures imposed
by the whims and prejudices of the electorate. The system our
Constitution deploys, through an entrenched countermajoritarian
document and a prophylactically insulated judiciary empowered to
interpret and enforce it, represents a structurally superior method
of protecting against majoritarian choices and tyranny.
Our goal is to define clearly what American constitutionalism is
and not necessarily to explain why it is plainly superior to all other
forms of constitutionalism. It may be that other systems of govern-
mental ordering more productively advance the shared interests of
their governed. But if the skeptical optimism at the heart of our
constitutionalism grows out of recognition of some reality of human
nature, if there is some truth to the notion that humankind has
extraordinary potential both to flourish and to oppress, then the
traditionalist form of American constitutionalismfundamentally,
countermajoritarian checking of majoritarian power designed to
preserve the rule of law activated through a written, supreme posi-
tive law and a prophylactically insulated judicial interpreteris
well tailored to implement it.
34. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding the constitutionality of
same-sex sodomy laws); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the
constitutionality of imprisoning persons of Japanese descent in internment camps during the
Second World War); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding the constitutionality
of state laws mandating racial segregation).
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I. TRADITIONALIST CONSTITUTIONALISM REVISITED: STRUCTURAL
CHOICES WITH HISTORICAL EXPLANATIONS
One of the most challenging tasks we face in developing a
premodern theory of American constitutionalism is pinpointing the
traditionalism to which we urge a return. There is no rich literature
devoted to the defense or development of the traditionalist model.
Our Constitution employs a variety of tools and structures as means
to achieve its underlying aim of defining a balance of powers built
to avoid tyranny. For years, the scholarly debate focused squarely
on what those tools and structures were, what their nature and lim-
itations were, and how those tools were to be properly utilized.35
Formalists argued with functionalists over the best use of our
constitutional regimes implementational tools, but they never ar-
gued about the underlying principles for which those tools existed
in the first place.36 The traditionalism to which we refer has long
been essentially a root assumption, not a logically reasoned conclu-
sion.
For this reason, before examining the development of the two
modernist views of American constitutionalism, we must explicate
our traditionalist model. This traditionalist theory holds that the
core of American constitutionalism is countermajoritarian checking
of majoritarian power. In order to implement this vision, our regime
relies upon a structural, written Constitution subject only to super-
majoritarian modification, and a prophylactically insulated judi-
ciary, which is to act as the final arbiter of the documents meaning.
This structure is uniquely suited to strike a crucial balance em-
bodying what we call skeptical optimism. On the one hand, our
35. See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 8; H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON
WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY AND POLITICS (2002); MARTIN H. REDISH, THE
CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE (1995).
36. Compare REDISH, supra note 35, Gary Lawson, In Praise of Woodenness, 11 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 21 (1988), and Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, If Angels Were to
Govern: The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J.
449 (1991) (all advocating various degrees of formalism), with JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND THE NATIONALPOLITICALPROCESS:A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE
OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980), and MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE
JUDICIARY (1982) (both championing functionalism).
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Constitution optimistically establishes representative government
through the granting of a series of majoritarian powers: recognizing
the continuing value of republican state governments in a federalist
system, granting legislative authority to a representative Congress,
and extending executive power to an elected President. Empowering
majorities in this fashion grants freedom to the People to realize
their potential and to flourish. On the other hand, our Constitution
provides a series of countermajoritarian checks, the most important
of which is the insulated Article III judiciary designed to safeguard
minority views against majoritarian overreach and ensure that the
supreme lawagainst which the legality of all other laws is mea-
suredmay be formally altered only by legal supermajoritarian
action.
Put differently, the traditionalist view of American constitutional-
ism understands our nations contribution to political theory as the
construction of a regime that, due to its dedication to countermajor-
itarianism, uniquely implements its optimism that humankind can
flourish if empowered. That same dedication to countermajoritari-
anism is due to its skepticism that unchecked empowerment will
naturally devolve into tyranny.
A. The Core Principle: Skeptical Optimism
Traditionalist constitutionalism consists of two fundamental
elements. The first is the core principle at the heart of American
constitutionalism, which can be found within the historical context
from which our Constitution sprang forth. The second is the political
apparatus effectuating that principle, which is embedded in the
structural Constitution itself and is best proven by a form of reverse
engineering. We address each of these in turn.
First, reference to the historical context within which the
Framers operated to develop our Constitution reveals the principal
concerns that guided its construction. Two shadows loomed over the
Framers when they gathered in Philadelphia to devise a new na-
tional charter in 1787. One was the memory of a revolution fought
for the notion of no taxation without representation37the new
37. See J. Grant Dorfman, The Founders Legal Case: No Taxation Without Represen-
tation Versus Taxation No Tyranny, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1377, 1378-79 (2008).
1842 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1825
Constitution would need to enshrine representative government to
ensure that power belonged, first and foremost, to the People
themselves. The other was the failure of the Articles of Confedera-
tion, the original national charter that established a comically weak
and ultimately dysfunctional federal government whose flaws gave
rise to the convention in the first place.38
Breaking free from Britain was not merely an act of defiance
against the antics of King George. It was also an act of defiance
against a system of governance that was unacceptably unrepre-
sentative of American colonists and unconcerned with protecting
minority interests against majority rule.39 Britain was a monarchy,
of course, but its governmental structure was at the time one which
granted supremacy to its majoritarian branch. Parliamentary sover-
eignty firmly defined the British system of governance. Britain had
no written constitution or formally entrenched higher law.40 Legal
change in Britain was left entirely to the discretion of Parliament,
a legislative body empowered to enact ordinary legislation and to
ultimately determine the legality and legitimacy of such legislation,
38. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 11-12, 21 (1996). The mission of the convention had originally been to amend
the Articles of Confederation, but the Framers quickly realized that more sweeping change
was necessary. Id. at 102. Even those who expressed concern that the convention was acting
outside the Articles express instruction as to amendment did so halfheartedlythe clear aim
of the convention was to break from the disastrous Articles and establish a meaningfully
empowered national government. Id. at 102-03, 123.
39. See Richard R. Johnson, Parliamentary Egotisms: The Clash of Legislatures in the
Makingof the American Revolution, 74 J. AM. HIST. 338, 338-39 (1987). Johnson explains that
the taught version of American history is not per se wrong to lay blame at the feet of King
George, but that it fundamentally misses the point insofar as the only reason the monarch
moved the needle was that Parliament acquiesced in his exercise of power and was consti-
tutionally incapable of checking either itself or the monarch. Id. at 341-42; see also Paul
Langford, Old Whigs, Old Tories, and the American Revolution, 8 J. IMPERIAL & COM-
MONWEALTH HIST. 106, 110-11 (1980) (espousing a similar view that the American Revolution
was not merely a rebuke of monarchical rule, but alsoand perhaps more importantlya
rebuke of the politics of parliamentary sovereignty).
40. See Johnson, supra note 39, at 343 (There remained a tradition of belief in a
fundamental law that placed limits on the exercise of arbitrary power by any branch of
government, a tradition that was to find a receptive audienceand, eventually, a permanent
homein the American colonies. In England, however, political theory and reality moved in
tandem toward a magnification of parliamentary power. The Glorious Revolution of 1688
confirmed Parliaments power as guardian and interpreter of the ancient constitution.).
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for the same majority necessary to pass legislation had the power to
override any judicial determination of illegality.41
Soon after the colonies won their independence, the failed experi-
ment of the Articles of Confederation began.42 In many respects, the
Articles were doomed from the start; intentionally devised to
establish a feeble national government, they featured no presidency
and a diffuse, largely impotent legislature.43 Within less than a
decade, the confederacy of states had functionally collapsed, and the
states sent their delegates to Philadelphia with full knowledge that
the result of the convention would have to be a stronger national
government with meaningful legislative and executive capacities.44
The Constitution thus was developed within the context of two
countervailing sentiments. On the one hand, the framing generation
knew that in order to facilitate the human capacity for flourishing
and to ensure that American society could achieve its potential, our
new nation would need a strong, majoritarian, representative gov-
ernment that empowered the people.45 On the other hand, the
Framers were well aware of both world history and their nations
own recent history. They understood that humankind is just as
disposed to folly as to flourish and that concentration of power in
the majority, even when representative, could easily devolve into
tyranny.46 This skeptical optimism became the core driving force
of American constitutionalism.
41. See Lori Ringhand, FigLeaves, Fairy Tales, and Constitutional Foundations: Debating
Judicial Review in Britain, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL L. 865, 873-74 (2005) (discussing
Parliaments supremacy over judicial review in Britain).
42. Though they ultimately proved incapable of properly constituting our national govern-
ment and securing our constitutional vision, through their use of supermajority rules, the
Articles were perhaps our countrys first attempt to implement the countermajoritarianism
that would come to define our Constitution. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 13, at 717.
43. See Douglas G. Smith, An Analysis of Two Federal Structures: The Articles of
Confederation and the Constitution, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 249, 253-54 (1997).
44. See RAKOVE, supra note 38, at 23-34; Smith, supra note 43, at 254 n.11; see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 40, supra note 20 (James Madison) (explaining that fixing our national
system was going to require a more massive overhaul than simply improving and amending
the Articles of Confederation).
45. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 20, at 255 (James Madison) (describing a gov-
ernment which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people).
46. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 36, at 451.
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B. The Apparatus: Countermajoritarian Checkingof Majoritarian
Power
The second element of the traditionalist model is the political ap-
paratus devised to implement the skeptical optimism at the heart
of our form of constitutionalism. The Framers skeptical optimism
is readily apparent in Founding Era literature and is embedded in
the history of both the American Revolution and the Founding. But
its political apparatus is best explicated by reverse engineering from
the structural Constitution itself.
With the historical realities motivating their skeptical optimism
in full view, the Framers made two crucial decisions about how the
American constitutional system would be shaped. First, in a decisive
break from the British tradition, America would have a written Con-
stitution that would serve as its singular, supreme law. And second,
that Constitution would, by its terms and design, establish an
empowered but limited federal government.47 The Constitution the
Framers produced was a direct response to parliamentary sover-
eigntys potential for tyranny,48 an affirmative statement of the new
republics constitutive law, and an effort to balance the states in-
terests in maintaining a degree of autonomy while establishing a
strong enough national government to preserve national economic
and political health within the global community.49
The structures that were chosen to implement this vision of
American governance are themselves quite revealing of the prin-
ciples at the heart of our constitutionalism. The Constitution was
foundational, prescriptive, and aspirational, but it was primarily
built to deter the accumulation of power in a single branch or
system.50 Although dedicated to preserving state sovereignty, the
47. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 20 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing a
constitution of limited government); THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 20 (James Madison)
(arguing for structural checks to ensure limits on executive and legislative power).
48. See Daniel A. Farber, Judicial Review and Its Alternatives: An American Tale, 38
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 415, 415 (2003) (arguing that the United States rejected congressional
supremacy because of the potential that tyranny would ensue).
49. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 20 (James Madison) (expounding upon the
system of checks and balancing that would come to define our constitutional structure).
50. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 20, at 309 (James Madison) (claiming that
assembling all power in the same hands must lead to ... tyranny); THE FEDERALIST NO. 62,
supra note 20, at 366 (James Madison) (describing the propensity of all single and numerous
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Constitution vested executive power in an elected President51 and
vested legislative authority in a full-fledged, permanent, bicameral
Congress.52 Although it foundationally empowered each of the
majoritarian branches, it sought to guard against domination by
faction and, shortly after ratification, codified a Bill of Rights
affirmatively setting forth a list of negative individual rights based
on the most cherished bedrock principles of our new constitutional
republic.53 And most important of all, despite their unwavering
commitment to representative democracy and political account-
ability, the Framers conferred the judicial power, in writing, to a
judicial branch that would, for all practical purposes, be politically
unaccountable.54
As we will show later, perhaps the simplest way to prove the
correctness of the traditional understanding of American consti-
tutionalism is by examining and disproving modern challenges to
the traditional theory. But without reference to modernist argu-
ments, traditionalism finds its strongest support in basic logic
grounded in reverse engineering: there is simply no good alternative
explanation for the momentous decision to break from the British
tradition and write our Constitution down in mandatory language,
proclaim the supremacy of the Constitution as positive law, make
it subject to alteration only through a complex supermajoritarian
process, and create a politically unaccountable judiciary charged
with constitutional interpretation. Creation of one of the three
branches as a prophylactically insulated body in a nation created on
the promise of representationalism was no accident. The political
apparatus at the core of our constitutionalism was quite clearly a
system of countermajoritarian checking of majoritarian power.
This continued to be true even as other nations experimented
with new, different constitutional regimes deploying different po-
litical apparatuses and cherishing different central animating
principles. The American Constitution was the first of its kind, so it
assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by
factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions).
51. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
52. Id. art. I, § 1.
53. Id. amends. I-X; see Jenna MacNaughton, Comment, Positive Rights in Constitutional
Law: No Need to Graft, Best Not to Prune, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 750, 762 (2001).
54. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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is no exaggeration to say that from the late eighteenth century
through the nineteenth century, asking whether a regime was con-
stitutionalist was the equivalent of asking whether it had adopted
the same constitutional structure employed by the United States.
The word constitution derives from the Latin constitutio, meaning
enactment, and original understanding of the word did not suggest
the embodiment of a states highest law.55 As early as the second
century, however, the plural constitutiones was used to describe a
collection of sovereign enactments or even church-enacted canonical
law.56 Accordingly, the idea of the word constitution meaning high-
er, foundational law framing the exercise of public power stretched
back several centuries before the Founders gathered in Philadel-
phia, but constitutionalism as a political philosophy really took hold
and blossomed in the wake of the American Constitutional Conven-
tion.
Constitutions continued to spring up throughout the world,
employing alternative methods of government ordering, political
organization and structure, and protection of individual liberties.57
As a result, the definition of constitutionalism broadened to capture
these constitutional structures.58 Today, constitutionalism is a
political philosophy wherein good government requires promulga-
tion of a code of bedrock principles that defines the relationship
between government and the governed both by defining the scope
and limitations of government power and by securing individual
rights and liberties.59 As a discipline of political discourse, consti-
tutionalism is the systematization of thinking about constitutions
grounded in the development since the [mid-twentieth] century of
supranational normative systems against which constitutions are
55. Giovanni Sartori, Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
853, 853 (1962).
56. Id.
57. See Steven Mintz, The Survival of the US Constitution, GILDER LEHRMAN INST.
AM. HIST., http://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/creating-new-government/resources/
survival-us-constitution [https://perma.cc/5GMA-GBJ3]; see also infra notes 165-69 and ac-
companying text.
58. See Sartori, supra note 55, at 862-63.
59. See Law & Versteeg, supra note 15, at 1188 (advocating a functional definition in the
determination of whether a legal instrument is constitutional or could be considered a
constitution).
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legitimated.60 Broadly defined, constitutionalism is a method of un-
derstanding the orderly, civilized profiling of the interface between
the people and their government, subject to the rule of law.61
There are, to be sure, a variety of ways in which constitutional
regimes may practice constitutionalism. This is because constitu-
tionalism is defined simply by the existence of a code of clear and
identifiable foundational principles of government and social order-
ing, not by the means a regime uses to establish, implement, and
enforce that code.62 Whether a constitution is written or unwritten,
or whether it provides for pure majoritarian rule or envisions a
countermajoritarian check, it can still, potentially, constitute a legit-
imate exercise of constitutionalist governance.63
Modernist constitutional scholars celebrate general substance
over particular form, holding that constitutions are the laws and
norms structuring a peoples relationship with its government and
defining how government can exercise public power.64 John Ferejohn
and Lawrence Sager have noted that constitutional practices can
60. Backer, supra note 23, at 676.
61. See Vicki C. Jackson, Whats in a Name? Reflections on Timing, Naming, and Con-
stitution-Making, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1249, 1254 (2008) (Constitutionalism entails a
sufficiently shared willingness to use law rather than force to resolve disagreements; to limit
government power and to protect human rights through law and defined processes; to provide
a reasonable degree of predictability and stability of law that people may rely on as they
structure their lives; and to maintain a government that is legitimate and effective enough
to maintain order, promote the public good, and control private violence and exploitation.).
62. Backer, supra note 23, at 679 (defining constitutionalism as (1) a system of
classification, (2) the core object of which is to define the characteristics of constitutions (those
documents organizing political power within an institutional apparatus), (3) to be used to
determine the legitimacy of the constitutional system as conceived or as implemented, (4)
based on rule of law as the fundamental postulate of government (that government be
established and operated in a way that limits the ability of individuals to use government
power for personal welfare maximizing ends), and (5) grounded on a metric of substantive
values derived from a source beyond the control of any individual) (emphasis omitted).
63. For reasons we shall explain later, we believe that constitutions that do not formally
provide a countermajoritarian check to majoritarian power by way of a politically unac-
countable judiciary are more likely to devolve into illegitimacy. See infra Part IV. But we
acknowledge that even nations that do not employ this system of constitutionalism can
operate legitimate, constitutional governance, even if that governance is not constitutional
in the American sense of the word. See infra Part III.
64. See, e.g., David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The DecliningInfluence of the United States
Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 854 (2012); Law & Versteeg, supra note 15, at 1188 (in
an empirical study, counting as constitutionalist any regime with written law that could be
designated constitutional, including both legal constitutionalist regimes, like the United
States, and diffuse political constitutionalist regimes, like the United Kingdom).
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usefully be understood as commitment devices, methods for govern-
ments to express to both citizens and outsiders their commitments
to protecting private property, recognizing unpopular minorities, or
furthering the rule of law.65 David Law has likewise defined consti-
tutions as the set[s] of rules and practiceswritten or otherwise
that allocate[], and structure[] the exercise of, public power.66
Structuring a nations political powers, defining a nations most
cherished individual rights, and ensuring that the government
provides a mechanism for protecting liberty are all key aspects of
the process of codifying government power and limitation through
constitutionalism.67 But todays understanding of constitutionalism
suggests that nations have a variety of options to effect this
purpose. Ultimately, whether a regime employs a form of consti-
tutionalism and whether a constitutional regime is legitimate are
entirely different questions. Some regimes that employ a written
constitution with affirmative guarantees as to government structure
and individual rights fail to live up to the promises enshrined in
their constitutions.68 Other regimes with no bill of rights or desig-
nated higher law have proven legitimate by constitutionalist
standards because they otherwise identify the principles of law that
constrain their governments and provide for the wellbeing of their
governed.69
We mention all this to emphasize that, despite the changing
conception of what a nation must actually do to have a constitution
and adhere to constitutionalism as a political dogma, American
65. John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment and Constitutionalism, 81 TEX. L.
REV. 1929, 1929 (2003).
66. David S. Law, The Paradoxof Omnipotence: Courts, Constitutions, and Commitments,
40 GA. L. REV. 407, 416 (2006); see also Frank I. Michelman, What Do Constitutions Do that
Statutes Dont (Legally Speaking)?, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF
LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 273, 283-86 (Richard W. Baumann & Tsvi
Kahana eds., 2006) (arguing that even systems with written constitutions invariably rely on
unwritten constitutions to find their rules of recognition).
67. See Robin West, Katrina, the Constitution, and the Legal Question Doctrine, 81 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1127, 1128-29 (2006) ([Constitutionalism] should be understood as entailing
that states are obligated to ensure that all citizens enjoy those basic capabilities necessary
to lead a decent life.).
68. See Law & Versteeg, supra note 23, at 872 (noting socioeconomic and group rights are
often widely violated).
69. See id. at 882 (pointing out that Australia, despite lacking a bill of rights, respects a
panoply of rights).
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constitutionalism has always been defined by its structural design
and underlying goods.70 The two are inseparable. The American
Constitution was not written simply to establish and define the rela-
tionship between the government and the governed, though it surely
does that; rather, it was written primarily to effectuate a very par-
ticular relationship premised on a form of universal and mutual
distrust.
Other nations have chosen alternative ways to establish, im-
plement, and enshrine their codes of bedrock principle, and this
variation does not automatically make them any less constitutional-
ist, at least on an abstract, definitional level. But the traditionalist
view recognizes that American constitutionalism is, at its core,
about enshrining countermajoritarianism. One can strip away
whatever else one wishes from our constitutional design, but our
Constitution ceases to implement American constitutionalism the
moment one undermines the principal activating force of our sys-
tem: an entrenched, written, countermajoritarian statement of
positive law subject to interpretation and enforcement by a prophy-
lactically insulated judiciary.
We readily acknowledge that merely providing for an insulated
judiciary is not necessarily the same thing as providing for prophy-
lactically insulated judicial review or judicial supremacy. Scholars
have puzzled over the basis of judicial review for quite some time.
Nothing expressly written into the American Constitution explicitly
states that there shall be judicial enforcement of the metes and
bounds of constitutional directives, either between the states and
the federal government or between the federal governments coequal
branches. It seems as though, in order for traditionalism to carry
any water, there must be some textual basis for judicial review.
Here, we briefly explain why the structural Constitution necessarily
demands judicial review.
70. See Vasiliy A. Vlasihin, Political Rights and Freedoms in the Context of American
Constitutionalism: A View of a Concerned Soviet Scholar, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 257, 258 (1989)
(Making up the core of [American] constitutionalism are the ideas of popular sovereignty
and a social contract as the source of the government; the principles of republicanism,
federalism, separation of powers, and government limited by law; respect for the rights and
liberties of citizens and the protection of private property; the rule of law and the supremacy
of the Constitution; and independence of the judiciary and judicial review.).
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It is worth noting that judicial review appeared to be assumed by
the Framers at the time of ratification. Alexander Hamilton con-
sciously sought to switch the textual inertia in The Federalist No.
78, taking notice of the importance of judicial review and essentially
suggesting that unless the text of our new Constitution foreswore
judicial review, it should logically be deemed part and parcel of the
exercise of judicial power under Article III.71 But, judicial review
might also find its textual basis in the arising under language of
Article III: by giving the judiciary the power to adjudicate all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority,72 the Constitution empowered the judicial
branch to enforce the Constitutions limits and ensured both vertical
power checking (constitutional federalism and supremacy enforce-
ment) and horizontal power checking (separation of powers).
Yet another textual basis for at least the bulk of judicial review
is the guarantee of due process contained in the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments.73 Both amendments forbid governmental
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.74
The argument that these provisions codify judicial review can be
framed in one of two ways. First, it could be asserted that any time
individual rights to liberty, property, or life are placed at risk, a
neutral, independent adjudicator is a fundamental component of
the due process guarantee. This rationale works well when a right
guaranteed by the Constitution is at stake. But the direct link be-
tween a structural breach (by one branch upon another or by the
federal government upon the states) and the infringement of a
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause is, some might
argue, problematically attenuated.
71. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 20, at 437, 440 (Alexander Hamilton) ([Judicial
review] is an excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince; in a republic it is a no less
excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body.... [T]he
courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against
legislative encroachments.).
72. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
73. Some have argued that just by setting forth both a Bill of Rights and an article
devoted to establishing a judiciary, the Constitution implicitly established judicial review for
the primary purpose of rights enforcement. See Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement
of the Bill of Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1529, 1534-35 (2000).
74. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV.
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The other way to frame due process as the textual basis for
judicial review is to argue that any litigant who satisfies Article IIIs
standing requirement of injury in fact or who stands to lose property
by way of a damages award in a case or controversy has a due
process right to an independent adjudicator. Due process, then, is
not triggered by the nature of the particular claim being brought,
but by the fact that a property interest is at stakeregardless of
the substantive basis for a claim. Alternatively, it could be argued
that judicial review arises out of constitutional due process in two
other, related ways: first, in disputes with or between governmental
branches, adjudication must be neutral; and second, under Chief
Justice Marshalls private rights model, deciding constitutional
meaning is incident to deciding cases in which constitutional issues
are raised.75
Herbert Wechsler proposed the Supremacy Clause76 as the textual
anchor for judicial review.77 His argument was that, in textually
declaring the Constitution the supreme law of the land, the
Constitution itself demanded judicial review.78 Yet this theory is
problematically question begging. Yes, the Supremacy Clause dic-
tates that the Constitution shall be the supreme law of the land, but
that says nothing about which branch gets to say what that Con-
stitution means. It can sensibly be read to imply the judiciarys role
in enforcing vertical power checking, but, without the logical
implication that Hamilton recognized in The Federalist No. 78,79 the
question of the judiciarys role as a means of prophylaxis against
horizontal breaches remains unresolved.
In truth, the most logical explanation of judicial review is, as
described in our earlier discussion, common sense, a conclusion
derived through both logic and reverse engineering from the struc-
tural Constitution itself. The Constitution was the product of debate
and coordination among a group of people who sought respite from
75. See Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the
Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 457, 481 (1986).
76. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
77. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 3-5 (1959).
78. See id. at 3.
79. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
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the unrepresentative government of England,80 feared faction,81 and
worried about the tyranny of accumulated power.82 Yet, despite the
Framers deep-seated belief in representative government, the Con-
stitution set forth a federal judiciary that was thrice insulated from
majoritarian whim: the judicial branch would be staffed by unelect-
ed judges, serving lifelong terms with salary protections, and only
removable by impeachment for bad behavior.83 In other words, the
judiciary would be completely politically unaccountable. No logical
explanation exists for the provision of an unaccountable judiciary
except the obvious one: that the entrenched, countermajoritarian
Constitution would need such an insulated, prophylactic judiciary
to police its structural mandate and ensure its supremacy.84
The defining goal of American constitutionalism is to strike a
balance between democracy and distrust.85 Our constitutionalism is
concerned with fulfilling the promise of an American dream and
rewarding communitarianism. The Constitution trusts majorities to
elect representatives who will legislate and a President who will
execute laws in accordance with the will of the people on a day-to-
day basis, and trusts the states to serve as laboratories of democracy
and capitalist experimentation.86 But it leaves no room for the power
of the majority to overtake minority interests. By defining our
80. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
81. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 20 (James Madison).
82. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
83. See Stephen Shapiro, The Judiciary in the United States: A Search for Fairness,
Independence, and Competence, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 667, 668-69 (2001) (citing U.S.
CONST. art. II, §§ 2, 4; id. art. III, § 1).
84. Prophylaxis need not necessarily be activist. See John F. Manning, The Supreme Court
2013 Term Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 67-68 (2014).
Professor Manning argues that the Constitution creates a sort of deference regime in favor
of congressional interpretation. Id. at 60-65. He says that the Constitution affords great
discretion to Congress to do what is necessary and proper to effectuate its delegated power,
so the courts should not step in to police the boundaries of congressional power unless
Congress has applied a clearly violative interpretation of necessary and proper. Id. at 83. This
may or may not be right, but even if it is assumed to be correct, Professor Mannings approach
still charges the judiciary with the duty to determine when another branchs interpretation
is clearly violative of the Constitution. See id. Thus regardless of whether the judiciary is
deferential to congressional or executive interpretation, even a deference regime implies that
the judiciary retains the last word on issues of constitutional interpretation.
85. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 183
(1980) ([C]onstitutional law appropriately exists for those situations where representative
government cannot be trusted.).
86. See Manning, supra note 84, at 44, 56, 83.
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supreme law in a single Constitution that provides for counterma-
joritarian checks by a prophylactically insulated judiciary, American
constitutionalism is uniquely tailored to create a formal barrier
against slipping into tyranny.
II. THE MODERNIST DEPARTURES FROM THE TRADITIONALIST
POSITION
In Part I, we described what we have labeled the traditionalist
view of American constitutionalism. American constitutionalism is,
at its core, the embodiment of skeptical optimism in a political
apparatus of countermajoritarian checking of majoritarian power.
Our skeptical optimism is effectuated by enshrining our highest law
in an entrenched written document subject to formal revision only
by means of supermajoritarian amendment and whose limitations
are subject to enforcement by an insulated countermajoritarian in-
terpreterthe judiciary. Subsequent debates about the mechanics
of implementing this vision typically skip explaining or defending
this first step because it is simply taken for granted.
In recent years, however, scholars have developed two forms of
what can be called modernist theory. Although acceptance of these
theories in the courts is all but nonexistent, highly esteemed com-
mentators have taken up their cause, and a wealth of literature has
sprung forth advancing their arguments. Modernist scholars have
engaged in an attack on the theoretical foundations located in step
one, essentially challenging the nature of our constitutionalism
itself. Constitutional realists and proponents of the extracanon-
ical constitution challenge the premise that the complete American
constitutional regime is set forth in the singular written document
we identify as the Constitution.87 Departmentalists and popular
constitutionalists, on the other hand, acknowledge the value and
weight of our written Constitution as the complete source of our
supreme positive law, but dispute the role of the judiciary and thus
our Constitutions countermajoritarian roots.88
87. See ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 32-36 (advocating for a living constitution that
incorporates other important legal documents into the constitutional canon); Young, supra
note 1, at 413; infra Part II.A.
88. See KRAMER, supra note 1, at 246-48 (discussing scholars that dispute the counter-
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Puzzlingly, scholars in each of these two camps devote virtually
no attention to one another. But they are more alike than they
realize, for they both misidentify the fundamental characteristic
that makes our constitutionalism ours. We refer to both of these
classes of scholar as modernists because both mark a clear break
from the traditionalist view of American constitutionalism we
have identified.89 Unfortunately, both scholarly groups advocate
approaches that, for reasons outlined below, we must largely reject.
A. Against the Constitution as Our Unique Supreme Law
Constitutional Realism and the Extracanonical Constitution
The classical story of American constitutionalism should be
familiar to anyone who has ever graduated from grade school in the
United States: In 1787, the Founders gathered in Philadelphia to
reconstitute the federal government in the wake of the failure of the
Articles of Confederation.90 They crafted a written document design-
ed to set forth the rule of law, define the order of legal supremacy,
and construct our federal governmental structure. The document
was ratified and amended shortly thereafter to include a list of
negative rights.91 Over the next two hundred years, the document
was amended seventeen more times, and judicial interpretation of
the document and its amendments helped the American people and
their representatives understand the scope and limitations of
constitutional governmental power.92
This was how early American legal theorists defined our constitu-
tional government. In the late eighteenth century, the Founders
understood the Constitution to embody the sum total of American
supreme law.93 One hundred years later, as the people rejoiced in
majoritarian premise of American constitutionalism); TUSHNET, supra note 8, at 26 (arguing
that Congress and U.S. citizens should be skeptical of the Supreme Courts judicial supremacy
and its decisions defining the scope of its own power); Paulsen, supra note 1, at 221
(advocating that no department has exclusive authority over saying what the law is); infra
Part II.B.
89. See supra Part I.
90. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
91. See Mehrdad Payandeh, Constitutional Aesthetics: Appending Amendments to the
United States Constitution, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 87, 87-88 (2011).
92. See id. at 87-88, 118.
93. See Jack N. Rakove, The Super-Legality of the Constitution, or, a Federalist Critique
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the centennial anniversary of the Constitutions ratification, com-
mentators hailed the uniqueness of the American constitutional
regime.94 The power of the American Constitution, they wrote with
reverence, came in its brilliant duality: a written document enacted
by the people, but entrenched against change and not subject to the
shifting choices of momentary majorities.95 Use of the written
format was key, for how would it be possible to argue upon the con-
stitutionality of any measure, when there was no constitution in
existence?96
The story of the American Constitution told by a number of highly
regarded twentieth- and twenty-first century constitutional schol-
ars, however, is strikingly different. Starting with Karl Llewellyn,
the twentieth century saw scholars adopt what they termed a
realist view of the Constitution.97 Llewellyn argued that the
Constitutions text and the system set forth therein constitutes our
government only insofar as modern practice and conventions con-
tinue to perpetuate their reign.98 His primary argument was that
the only elements of the Constitution that live on today are those to
of Bruce Ackermans Neo-Federalism, 108 YALE L.J. 1931, 1957 (1999) (Fixated as ... Madison
was on the belief that the interested, opinionated, and impassioned impulses of the people
would be the preponderant sources of constitutional disequilibria, the last possibility that he
wanted to contemplate was that the people would ever be called upon to speak so vigorously
again. In the womb of time, no one could predict what future decades, generations, or cen-
turies would produce; but to the extent that Madison gazed into the future, he seemed to hope
that all future constitutional change would occur within the exclusio alterius bounds of Article
V.).
94. See Belz, supra note 16, at 113-14.
95. See 1 HERMANN VON HOLST, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES (John J. Lalor & Alfred B. Mason trans., Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1889)
(1876).
96. FREDERICK GRIMKE, CONSIDERATIONS UPON THE NATURE AND TENDENCY OF FREE
INSTITUTIONS 127 (New York, Derby & Jackson 2d ed. 1856); see Belz, supra note 16, at 111
(For most students of American government in the first half of the nineteenth century the
chief fact about the American constitution was, in the words of Francis Lieber, that It was
the positive enactment of the whole at one time, and by distinct authority. This quality of
being an enacted or written constitution, said Lieber, distinguishes it especially from the
English polity with its accumulative constitution consisting in usages and branches of the
common law, in decisions of fundamental importance, in self-grown and in enacted
institutions, in compacts, and in statutes embodying principles of political magnitude.
(quoting 1 FRANCIS LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 131, 221 (Philadelphia,
Lippincott, Grambo & Co. 1853))).
97. See generally K.N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV.
1 (1934).
98. Id. at 12.
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which modern Americans continue to adhere.99 Moreover, he argued,
the Constitution itself was merely an experimental first step toward
creating a constitutional institutiona broad code of behavior and
norms that structures the relationship between the people and their
government.100
Recent constitutional history contributed to the scholarly shift to
constitutional realism as well. This country has changed profoundly
over the last 150 years, but change has largely been effected outside
of the constitutional amendment procedure. Article V was written
to require supermajoritarian action to achieve constitutional amend-
ment precisely because the Constitution was our supreme law.101
Those elements of positive law that we mustered the strength to
etch into stone would be emblematic of our most cherished values
and would safeguard the spoils of social progress against arbitrary
repeal or reversal. Yet the reality is that since the years following
the Reconstruction Amendments, mostthough by no means all
of our greatest political and legal achievements have been imple-
mented by ways other than resort to the amendment process of
Article V.102
Over the last century and a half, the constitutional amendment
process has given Congress the power to levy an income tax,103 es-
tablished direct election of the Senate by popular vote,104 granted
women the right to vote,105 enacted106 and discarded prohibition
on the manufacture and sale of alcohol,107 changed the date the
99. Id.; cf. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 204, 225 (1980) (voicing the political scientists view of constitutionalism writ large that,
despite the Supremacy Clauses declaration that the Constitution is supreme law, it is only
through a history of continuing assent or acquiescence that the document could become law,
and our constitutional tradition is not concerned with the document alone).
100. Llewellyn, supra note 97, at 17-18.
101. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
102. In other words, the last time that the United States implemented dramatic social or
federal governmental change by way of the Article V amendment process was during Recon-
struction from 1865 to 1870, through the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.
See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
103. Id. amend. XVI.
104. Id. amend. XVII.
105. Id. amend. XIX.
106. Id. amend. XVIII.
107. Id. amend. XXI.
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President takes office108 and limited the number of terms he could
serve,109 granted electoral college votes to the District of Colum-
bia,110 and established the order of presidential succession.111
Meanwhile, the countrys changing perspective on individual
libertieswhich were quite clearly the focus of the Bill of Rights
and the Reconstruction Amendmentshas become the law of the
land mostly by way of statutes,112 treaties,113 and judicial deci-
sions.114 And the nation has implemented major changes to the
general structure of the federal government outside of the consti-
tutional amendment process as well, most notably in the broad
expansion of the administrative state throughout the New Deal.115
Article V amendment simply has not been the primary mechanism
by which post-Reconstruction America implements major structural
change or enshrines civil liberties.116
That great change has taken place without constitutional
amendment to facilitate it is one of the central proof points for con-
stitutional realists: because the American people have come to
understand new constraints on government power without Article
V amendment, the written document and its subsequent amend-
ments and judicial interpretations cannot possibly form the
108. Id. amend. XX.
109. Id. amend. XXII.
110. Id. amend. XXIII.
111. Id. amend. XXV.
112. See, e.g., Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-532, 78
Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17).
113. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
114. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (determining that sodomy laws
violate the Fourteenth Amendments guarantee of due process); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding that the Constitution protects an individuals right to priva-
cy); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that public school segregation
violates the Equal Protection Clause).
115. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the
Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 509-10 (2002).
116. This is not uniformly true, as the Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and even the Twenty-
Sixth Amendments each arguably served to enshrine new individual rights or civil liberties.
Yet even these amendments are illustrative: certainly the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did more
for the rights of African Americans than did the Twenty-Fourth Amendment; and although
the Nineteenth Amendment provided for womens suffrage, the Equal Rights Amendment
never quite made the cut. Ultimately, the majority of advances in minority rights over the last
150 years occurred outside of Article V amendment.
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complete American Constitution.117 Instead, constitutional realists
assert that the complete American Constitution must consist of
something more diffuse and difficult to ascertain. Realist commenta-
tors throughout the academy have thus taken to challenging the
value of the written Constitution, variously claiming that American
constitutionalism consists of the founding document and some
combination of statutes, judicial precedents, treaties, constitutional
understandings, social norms, movements, and conventions.118
To the extent that the realists are arguing that widespread
societal practice may effectively repeal provisions contained in the
formal document, their argument may well give rise to serious
moral problems. By that reasoning, presumably the longstanding
existence of Jim Crow laws in the post-Civil War South would
constitute a repealat least regionallyof the Fourteenth Amend-
ments Equal Protection Clause.119 This form of repeal by adverse
possession would of course defeat the purposes of having a written
constitution in the first place. To the extent the realists are arguing,
not that the written Constitution may be reduced by widespread
practice but rather that it may be augmented by such practice,
however, the issue becomes more complex. That the United States
has a written Constitution is beyond dispute. But that the docu-
ment written in 1787 and subsequently amended twenty-seven
times represents the complete United States Constitution is,
remarkably, far from settled.
Modernist theorists have argued that the complete American
Constitution is broader than the written document. Todd Pettys,
for example, has described the written Constitution as a myth
because the three chief functions the American Constitution
serves(1) creating, empowering, and limiting the branches of
the federal government; (2) establishing basic rights that may be
asserted against government action; and (3) providing rules of
recognitionare often accomplished by statutory or other non-
constitutional means.120 He writes:
117. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 51-52 (1991).
118. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 32; Matthew S.R. Palmer, UsingConstitutional
Realism to Identify the Complete Constitution: Lessons from an Unwritten Constitution, 54
AM. J. COMP. L. 587 (2006); Young, supra note 1.
119. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
120. Todd E. Pettys, The Myth of the Written Constitution, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 991,
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If a newcomer to the United States wished to understand the
structure of the federal government, the powers of its institu-
tions, the content of its citizens rights, and the rules and
principles from which Americans ultimately draw when deter-
mining whether the government has behaved permissibly in a
given instance, he or she would need to do much more than
merely study the texts that the American people formally have
assigned constitutional status.
....
... To many Americans today, individual rights conferred by
such statutes as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 are
every bit as important as many of those that are explicitly
conferred by the formally ratified constitutional texts. In these
respects, the 1787 document and its enumerated amendments
do comparatively little of the actual work of constituting the
nations government and of protecting individual rights that the
citizenry deems important.121
Bruce Ackerman takes a similar alien visitor angle.122 In the
latest addition to his We the People collection, Ackerman begins with
a fictional account of a conversation between himself and a hypo-
thetical Middle Eastern scholar who is ignorant of the Constitution
and the history of American social change, but is an otherwise
brilliant and capable constitutional interpreter.123 Professor Acker-
mans imaginary student walks through the Constitution, article by
article and amendment by amendment, but cannot glean from the
Constitution alone how modern Americans understand their rela-
tionship with the federal government.124 Ackerman rightly points
out that an alien with no knowledge of American history or custom
could learn a great deal about American constitutional law by read-
ing the original document and Bill of Rights, but would likely give
added weight and faulty historical significance to provisions that are
either unimportant or misleading.125 Likewise, he says, so limited a
1000 (2009).
121. Id. at 1001-02 (footnotes omitted).
122. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 23-26, 32.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 32.
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reading would fail to recognize the way major social movements
since the founding have informally amended the Constitution.126
Professor Ackermans theory revolves around the idea that on
occasion popular sovereignty leads to a groundswell, from movement
to party to president, and that at the end of a five-step process of
signaling, proposal, triggering, ratifying, and consolidation, the
people engage in informal constitutional amendment.127 These
constitutional moments change the meaning of the Constitution
in some permanent way.128 He argues that one such moment
occurred through the legislative action that took place during the
brief window in time from 1935-1938, after which Americans ac-
cepted the New Deal and the basically limitless nature of the
Commerce Clause.129 Professor Ackerman sees signaling in the elec-
tion of Roosevelt and the popular movement behind him; he sees
the growth of an active federal government that can truly regulate
commercial activity as the proposal; triggering in Roosevelts first
reelection; ratification in Roosevelts second reelection (even in spite
of his court-packing plan); and consolidation when, in later years,
even the Republicans simply accepted the new Rooseveltian federal
government as constitutionally permissible.130 In his latest volume,
Ackerman argues that the civil rights movement and the passage of
the Civil Rights Act together form another of his constitutional
moments.131 Asserting that the same five-step process of informal
amendment occurred in the 1960s, he says the Voting Rights Act,
the Civil Rights Act, and the progress this country made during the
civil rights revolution have been constitutionalizedeven though
they appear nowhere within the text of the document.132 I am
taking the next step, he says, urging you to discard the residual
quasis and other hesitations and grant full constitutional status to
the landmark statutes of the civil rights revolution. Otherwise, our
view of this great American triumph will be profoundly distorted.133
126. Id.
127. Bruce Ackerman, The LivingConstitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1762 (2007).
128. Id. at 1763.
129. 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 257 (1998).
130. Id. at 256-58.
131. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 118-19.
132. See generally id.
133. Id. at 34 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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Ernest Young has similarly employed Llewellyns realist logic to
pinpoint what he calls the constitution outside the Constitution.134
According to Professor Young, because some statutes, treaties, con-
ventions, and norms are constitutive in their form and their
function, they can be said to be part of the broader American Con-
stitution.135 Specifically relying on Llewellyn and other early
constitutional realists, Professor Young argues that the role of
ordinary law in constitutional ordering is pervasive and thus a
complete understanding of the American Constitution requires
interpreters to look beyond the Constitution as formally enacted.136
He points to a handful of statutes, including the Clean Water Act of
1976, and explains that because they serve a government-ordering
function and help to define our relationship with our government,
they form part of the American Constitution.137 Professor Young and
other realists argue that because other statutes share traits with
the Constitutionby creating government, conferring individual
rights, and being at least somewhat entrenched against change
they can be said to be part of the broader constitutional picture in
the United States.138
All of this amounts to self and public deception. Constitutional
realists challenge the fundamental import of the Constitutions
writtenness while purporting to leave intact the underlying prin-
ciples at the core of the American vision. They do not assert, for
example, that the judiciary is not possessed of interpretive power,
that the structures contained within the document fail to serve
checking purposes, or that the convention failed to produce a doc-
ument of meaningful constitutive value. Indeed, proponents of
constitutional realism and the extracanonical constitution would
likely not dispute the fundamental elements of the traditional view
of American constitutionalismthat the written Constitution imple-
mented American skeptical optimism through a political apparatus
comprised of countermajoritarian checking against majoritarian
poweras an assumed premise. Even if all of this is true, however,
134. Young, supra note 1, at 473.
135. Id.at 454.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 415-16.
138. Id.
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they argue that we have not necessarily located all of our nations
constitutive law in the written document.
The trouble with this argument, however, is that in order to ar-
rive at their conclusion that the written document need not embody
the entirety of American constitutive law, constitutional realists
necessarily disclaim skeptical optimism and countermajoritarian-
ism as defining characteristics of American constitutionalism.
Professor Pettyss three chief functions of the American Constitution
are fine descriptions of some of the Constitutions principal attrib-
utes,139 but ordinary legislation enacted by the majoritarian process
of bicameralism140 and presentment141 serves those functions in a
categorically different fashion. Unlike rights and dictates actually
grounded in the text of the Constitution, all of these statutes, no
matter how fundamental we currently deem them to be, may be
repealed by the traditionally majoritarian legislative process, which
requires only bicameralism and presentment. And we know this to
be trueironicallybecause the real Constitution tells us so.
The idea that much of our politically and legally transformative
law has been subconstitutional is perfectly consistent with the con-
cept of constitutional democracy. The formal amendment process
was purposely made extremely difficult in order to prevent the
current views of the prevailing majority from being constitutional-
ized because such change binds future majorities.142 It is only when
the alteration is truly foundational that it is to receive formal
constitutional status. As a result, on most occasions when majoritar-
ian preferences are transformed into law, they are just as easily
subject to future modification due to changes in those preferences.
Except for truly foundational matters that have received formal
constitutional status, democracy permits nothing else.
Perhaps the modern realists are engaged in a game of semantics.
Perhaps they have chosen simply to equate law that is so ingrained
within our nations tradition that it is reasonably characterized as
fundamental with law dictated by the Constitution. But while both
forms of law could plausibly be characterized as fundamental, that
does not mean the two forms of law are legally and structurally
139. Pettys, supra note 120, at 1000.
140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
141. Id. art. I, § 7.
142. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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identical. For example, the 1964 Civil Rights Act can be repealed if
majorities in both houses of Congress vote to do so, and the Presi-
dent signs that bill. The First Amendment, in stark contrast, may
not be repealed in this manner. Rather, it may be repealed only by
compliance with the extremely demanding requirements of Article
V. We presume that even Professors Ackerman and Young would
have to concede as much. Indeed, if they are unsure of this con-
clusion, a recent graduate of an eighth-grade civics course could
confirm it for them.143
Insofar as ordinary legislation limits federal governmental power
or establishes basic rights that may be asserted against the govern-
ment, one must ask how truly effective those limits are and how
basic the rights established actually are if temporary majorities
can easily erase them. To be sure, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
a powerful piece of legislation that inarguably expanded minority
rights and took a dramatic step toward perfecting the vision of the
Reconstruction Amendments. And it is true that given current poli-
tical realities, it is highly unlikely, if not unthinkable, that it will be
subject to repeal, at least in the foreseeable future. But American
constitutionalism is premised on the idea that mere political im-
probability is not sufficient to safeguard against the tyranny of
temporary majorities. Every trace of the prophylactic skepticism
that the traditionalist view places at the heart of our constitution-
alism vanishes when one ascribes constitutional weight to ordinary
legislation.
Moreover, any new federal power established by majoritarian act
can be nullified by the Supreme Court for noncompliance with the
enumerated powers contained within the written Constitution. It is
easy to say that, because of its profound impact on the process of
selecting the people who will serve as our representatives in the
federal government and its powerful role in defining the relation-
ship between people of color and their government, the Voting
143. Professors McGinnis and Rappaport argue that the requirement of bicameralism and
presentment is itself a tool of supermajoritarian rulemaking. See McGinnis & Rappaport,
supra note 13, at 712-13, 770-73. It may be true that the requirements of bicameralism and
presentment require more than a straight up-or-down democratic vote, but we believe that
to the extent that supermajoritarian effort is needed to enact ordinary legislation, it is of an
altogether different character from the supermajoritarian movement necessary to amend the
entrenched written Constitution and thereby safeguard a rule against easy repeal or revision.
1864 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1825
Rights Act is a piece of constitutive law.144 But reality belies realism,
as was made clear by the Court in Shelby County v. Holder, in which
the Court held unconstitutional Congresss method of implementing
a key provision of the Voting Rights Act because it violated the
structural federalism set forth in the Constitution.145
One might reasonably suggest that if we want to insulate legis-
lation such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 from the choices of future
majorities, we should constitutionalize it through Article Vs formal
amendment process. But purely as a matter of streetwise politics,
it is virtually inconceivable that this would ever happen at any time
in the foreseeable future. The reason, ironically, is that as presently
structured, the current Congress would probably never provide the
requisite majority, and if it were to do so, it is extremely doubtful
that the requisite supermajority of state legislatures would concur.
Constitutional realism is not only descriptively wrong, but also
normatively undesirable if for no other reason than that it renders
ambiguous at best and incoherent at worst a constitutional regime
whose core simplicity is one of its great virtues. If the Voting Rights
Act was part of an informal process of constitutional amendment or
is part of our broader American Constitution, was Shelby County
also a judicial act of constitutional amendment? Who gets to decide
when a constitutional moment has taken place?146
Moreover, the danger of ideological manipulation plagues any
attempt to extend the constitutional label beyond the four cor-
ners of the actual document.147 It is perhaps telling that Professor
Ackerman grants constitutional significance to the New Deal and
the legislation arising out of the civil rights movement,148 but not to
144. Indeed, Professors Ackerman and Pettys have argued as much. See ACKERMAN, supra
note 1, at 160-61; Pettys, supra note 120, at 1001-02; supra notes 117-133 and accompanying
text.
145. 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2630-31 (2013).
146. See Paul Horwitz, Honors Constitutional Moment: The Oath and Presidential Transi-
tions, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1067, 1067 (2009) (Constitutional moments are momentous, but
they are not irregular. To the contrary, they are routine. In particular, the changeover of
executive power that we are undergoing right now bears witness to a simple proposition: every
presidential transition is a constitutional moment.).
147. This is not to suggest that our approach dictates a historically based or originalist
mode of interpretation. It means only that to have constitutional status, a dictate or precept
must have grounding in the terms of the document.
148. See ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 18-19, 160-61.
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the Alien and Sedition Acts,149 the Internal Security Act of 1950,150
or the USA PATRIOT Act151all three of which served to change the
nature of the relationship between the government and the gov-
erned, had profound impacts on the exercise of federal power, and
contravened liberal values.152 Because of its inherently vague con-
tours, constitutional realism provides the opportunity for people to
engage in all sorts of definitional subterfuge to advance their own
political ideals.
What is most striking about the realist approach is, ironically,
just how unrealistic it is. Realist scholars assert that some aspects
of the written Constitution are borderline irrelevant because they
are not significant in defining the way the government executes
public power.153 Likewise, they say, some extracanonical laws and
norms are now to be deemed woven into the Constitution itself.154
But one need look no further than the Supreme Court Reporter to
see how our Supreme Court engages in all kinds of contortionism
just to stay within the boundaries set up by the written document.155
The very purpose of realism is to look past formality to acknowledge
what is actually happening in the world and describe things as they
are,156 but neither citizens nor the Court understand the statutes,
movements, or social norms that supposedly comprise the American
constitution outside the Constitution to actually function as our
constitutive law in the same way the Constitution does. If the Court
understood our Constitution as the realists do, the Court would
have no reason to search for an individual right to bear arms in the
Second Amendment157 or a right of privacy in the penumbras of the
149. An Act Respecting Alien Enemies (Alien Act), ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798).
150. Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 (Internal Security Act), Pub. L. No. 81-831,
64 Stat. 987.
151. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (codified in scattered statutes).
152. Cf., e.g., Martha Minow, Tolerance in an Age of Terror, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 453,
475 (2007) (characterizing the post-9/11 reaction as one that emphasize[d] the incursion on
rights and values in the United States, most often affecting immigrants, Muslims, and
political dissenters).
153. See Young, supra note 1, at 413, 432.
154. See id. at 410.
155. See infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
156. See Young, supra note 1, at 410 (citing Palmer, supra note 118, at 592-93).
157. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592, 595, 625 (2008).
1866 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1825
Bill of Rights.158 Nor would there have been a reason for either
conservative Justices to have grounded the concept of economic free-
domanomalouslyin the Due Process Clause,159 or later decisions
to reject that doctrine for the very reason that it had no basis in
text.160
All told, constitutional realism is unrealistic because it minimizes
the role of our written Constitution and extends constitutional
status to laws that can indisputably be altered or repealed by ma-
joritarian action.161 It therefore confuses the boundary between
supreme and inferior law in this country. Lawmakers, the American
people, and the Supreme Court have always understood the Consti-
tution as setting forth a dictated framework that, although subject
to changing interpretation by a countermajoritarian judiciary, at
its outer limits may only be changed by a difficult supermajoritarian
process.162 The American Constitution has always been accepted as
specifically removed from change by majoritarian process, and even
in the context of the New Dealthe closest thing to majoritarian
process changing our constitutional framework America has ex-
periencedthe Court never openly ignored this directive.163 A
somewhat later example is Griswold v. Connecticut: even when
recognizing rights never before found and with no textual basis in
the Constitution, the Court went out of its way to ground its decision
in the written Constitution (in that case, finding an individual right
to privacy embedded somewhere between the lines of the Bill of
Rights).164
In some ways, constitutional realism is merely a byproduct of
the increasing number of constitutions in existence throughout the
world. Since the Philadelphia convention in 1787, hundreds of
national constitutions have been drafted and ratified in countries
as far-flung and varied as China,165 South Africa,166 Spain,167 and
158. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
159. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
160. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
161. See Young, supra note 1, at 410.
162. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
163. See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
164. 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
165. See generally XIANFA (1982) (China).
166. See generally S. AFR. CONST., 1996.
167. See generally C.E., B.O.E. n.311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain).
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Argentina.168 Different regimes have deployed different structures
to effectuate constitutional governance and to enshrine a wide range
of values and national goals.169 As a result, the scholarly conception
of what defines constitutionalism has evolved to capture a wide
range of regime choices.170 Constitutional realism seems logically to
spring from the changing global perspective on what, generally
speaking, comprises a constitution.
This is how the divergent theories of political constitutionalism
and legal constitutionalism came to be viewed as concurrently
legitimate despite their seemingly contradictory designs. Elements
of each appear within the other, but the two approaches to constitu-
tionalism are, at their roots, diametrically opposed to one another.171
In her recent article about the British judiciary, Professor Erin
Delaney described the fundamental difference between legal
constitutionalism and political constitutionalism as the institution
or institutions entrusted with the responsibility for ensuring both
accountability and governmental (and possibly societal) fidelity to
the constitutional order.172 She wrote:
Legal constitutionalists maintain that constitutional goods are
best guaranteed through the articulation of rights-protecting
fundamental law, a law that stands superior to and apart from
daily political machinations and to which all governmental
institutions are bound, primarily through the mechanism of
judicial review. In contrast, political constitutionalists argue
that resting ultimate authority in a democratic parliament
better achieves the constitutional goods of rights and the rule
of law, by protecting values of democracy and republican non-
domination.173
168. See generally CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.).
169. Compare XIANFA arts. 1, 6 (1982) (China) (establishing socialist state), with C.E.,
B.O.E. n.311, arts. 1-2, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (establishing a social and democratic State
governed by a parliamentary monarchy).
170. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text (chronicling this evolution).
171. See Erin F. Delaney, Judiciary Rising: Constitutional Change in the United Kingdom,
108 NW. U. L. REV. 543, 548 (2014).
172. Id.; see also Paul Craig, Political Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, in EFFECTIVE
JUDICIAL REVIEW: A CORNERSTONE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE 19, 32 (Christopher Forsyth et al.
eds., 2010) (observing that political constitutionalism employs non-judicial mechanisms for
securing accountability).
173. Delaney, supra note 171, at 549 (quoting RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTI-
TUTIONALISM 10 (2007)).
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Importantly, political constitutionalism is almost invariably un-
written, or more precisely, written in scattered sources rather than
a single comprehensive written document.174 In contrast, legal con-
stitutionalism tends to look to a single source of supreme law.175
There are, to be sure, contrarian voices on both sides.176 Some schol-
ars have argued that political constitutional regimes might have a
role for courts to play and that political and social realities create a
dynamic within these regimes that might expand and calcify the
judicial role; some others have offered that majoritarian influences
should play a more significant role, and courts a lesser one, in legal
constitutional regimes.177 Thus, perhaps as a general, nation-ag-
nostic assessment of what comprises a constitution, realism makes
some sense. But constitutional realism has led to what should be an
impermissible logical next step: the practice of drawing lessons and
importing values from nations for whom constitutionalism is not
defined by the same core principles as is our own.
Scholars lean on Llewellyn, Ackerman, Young, William Eskridge,
and John Ferejohn to point out that a constitution is above all
elseand perhaps without all elsethe set of rules, standards,
practices, and norms that compose the continuing understanding of
how the government exercises power.178 If that is true, then the
American Constitution might look a lot more like the British or
Israeli constitutions than we realize, and might include a variety of
ordinary laws and norms outside of our constitutional document.
But as a matter of American constitutionalism, it seems at the very
least misleading, and more likely just categorically wrong, to ascribe
constitutional significance to extracanonical elements of our legal
regime.
The word Constitution has traditionally possessed special mean-
ing in the United States.179 It is a powerful word whose usage in
political speech and legal argumentation amounts to a trump
174. Id. at 550-51.
175. Id. at 553.
176. See Miguel Poiares Maduro, In Search of a Meaningand Not in Search of the Meaning:
Judicial Review and the Constitution in Times of Pluralism, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 541, 542-43.
177. See, e.g., id. at 551-52.
178. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215,
1248-49, 1248 n.149, 1258 n.194, 1269-71 (2001).
179. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that the U.S. Constitution is the supreme
Law of the Land).
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card.180 It is understood to be higher law, or the ground rules of the
game, and it limits the scope of all other discussion of American
law.181 A word might have a variety of definitions throughout the
world, but merely sharing traits with the Constitution does not
make these statutes part of the American Constitution. This is
precisely because the United States Constitution is contained within
a single document that provides for interpretation and enforcement
as supreme by the insulated judiciary.182 That design lays the foun-
dation for entrenchment, creation of government, and conferral of
individual rights upon which politics, social movements, and legis-
lation can build other elements of public power. By diminishing the
importance of the written Constitution and ascribing constitutional
significance to extraconstitutional directives, realist scholars desta-
bilize a constitutional regime that is uniquely situated to achieve a
very particular American constitutional mission. The complete
American Constitution cannot include statutes such as the USA
PATRIOT Act,183 the Civil Rights Act,184 or the Clean Water Act185
without diluting the power of our constitutional regime, especially
because each of these laws can legally be displaced by simple
majoritarian act.186
Constitutional realists conflate the idea of constitutionalism
evolving to accommodate other constitutional regimes with Ameri-
can constitutionalism evolving to include the other pieces of our code
that implement our bedrock principles. But what they fail to rec-
ognize is that our form of constitutionalism does not allow for
acknowledgment of bedrock principles in ordinary statutes.187 This
is because our method of promulgating a code that includes our
bedrock principles and determining how we would like to create,
implement, enforce, and protect that code is by means of a single
180. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 378 (1819).
181. See id.
182. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
183. But see Palmer, supra note 118, at 628 (implying that the USA PATRIOT Act is consti-
tutional in nature).
184. But see ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 18 (arguing that the Civil Rights Act is the
centerpiece of the living constitution).
185. But see Young, supra note 1, at 416, 433.
186. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 13, at 782, 797 n.398.
187. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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comprehensive document that establishes a checking branch.188
Including other forms of law under the constitutional heading
minimizes the uniqueness of our contribution to political theory,
threatens to dilute the force of the real Constitution, and gives rise
to at best enormous confusion, and at worst, cynical political man-
ipulation.
Given the traditional American understanding of the term
constitution, our concern is more than semantic, for to attribute
constitutional weight to noncountermajoritarian elements of our
legal and governmental system, regardless of the phrasing one uses,
is downright deceptive. To the extent that the words constitutional
and constitution retain their long-accepted American meaning, the
realists are simply wrong. American constitutionalism is, at its core,
the practice of codifying countermajoritarian limits on majoritarian
government. So long as those laws and norms that realists deem
part of the extracanonical constitution are subject to modification by
majoritarian processes,189 realists cannot be describing the Consti-
tution in the American sense of the word. And we know the
elements of the extracanonical constitution are subject to majoritar-
ian change, ironically, because the Constitution itself authorizes
majoritarian processes to change them.190
B. Against the Ultimate Countermajoritarian Check of Judicial
Supremacy Departmentalism and Popular Constitutionalism
Constitutional realists take a modernist position that the use of
a singular written document to set forth the totality of our supreme
constitutive law need not be viewed as a core characteristic of
American constitutionalism.191 But these scholars do not purport to
challenge the root principle or political apparatus embedded in the
Constitution. We think it unlikely that many of these scholars
would deny that the document we call our Constitution contains a
system of countermajoritarian checks to majority power, although,
as noted earlier, if one took literally the realists identification of
constitutionalism with accepted practice, this would not be true.
188. See Young, supra note 1, at 410.
189. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
190. See Belz, supra note 16, at 121-22.
191. See supra Part II.A.
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Instead, they primarily focus their energy on arguing that the writ-
ten Constitution is an incomplete capsule of our supreme law, both
because some elements contained within it are unimportant or
defunct and because various laws and movements outside the doc-
ument are politically entrenched and thus serve to define the
relationship between the government and the governed.192
In contrast, another group of modernist scholars claims to
understand and accept the countermajoritarian design of our
Constitution as well as the value such an apparatus advances, but
proposes that another of the key methods of activating this coun-
termajoritarian apparatus should not be considered central to our
constitutionalism and therefore should be abandoned.193 Rather
than challenging whether the written Constitution is the sole source
of our nations supreme law, these scholars challenge the validity
and worth of both judicial review and judicial supremacy.194 These
scholars may generally be sorted into two subcategories: depart-
mentalists and popular constitutionalists. Departmentalists are
those scholars who suggest that the Constitution neither commands
nor permits judicial supremacy.195 They argue for equal measures
of interpretive authority across all three branches of the government
and particularly emphasize the role of the executive in constitution-
al interpretation.196 Popular constitutionalists, on the other hand,
do not argue that judicial supremacy is unconstitutional, but in-
stead maintain that it is normatively undesirable and that, because
judicial review is not explicitly provided for in the Constitutions
192. See supra notes 97-118 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 1, at 221, 325 (arguing that the executive branch has a
right to interpret the law that is equal to and coordinate with that of the judiciary).
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. Although he is perhaps the best known among them, Michael Stokes Paulsen is not
the only champion of departmentalism; however, different scholars often advocate different
forms of the theory. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Caesarism, Departmentalism, and Professor
Paulsen, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1421 (1999); Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent
Branches: A Response to Professor Paulsen, 83 GEO. L.J. 347, 352 (1994); Keith E. Whittington,
Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV.
773, 783 (2002). It remains unclear, however, whether Professor Paulsen would view other
departmentalists as such, seeing as many of them either espouse disbelief in judicial review
(Paulsen does not) or reject presidential authority to refuse enforcement of judicial decrees
in particular casessomething Paulsen refers to as the Merryman power, which he views as
a valid exercise of executive interpretive power. See Paulsen, supra note 1, at 223.
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textual directives, constitutional interpretive authority can and
should be transferred from the unrepresentative judiciary back to
the people.197
Both theories should be viewed with skepticism and concern. The
prophylactically insulated judiciary is both an essential complement
to and a logical outgrowth of the explicit textual commitment to the
precept of countermajoritarianism. This nation was born of a revolu-
tion fought for political accountability, yet we quite consciously
chose to make one of the three branches of our fledgling national
government completely insulated from public accountability.198 This
decision was the result of recognizing that only by inclusion of an
entirely insulated judicial branch could this democratic republic be
protected from itself.199
Democracy embodies a belief in human flourishingthat the
people can control their own destiny by participating and believing
in their representative government.200 But by establishing a federal
government featuring a politically unaccountable coequal judicial
branch, the Framers effectively acknowledged that unchecked ma-
joritarian government would allow temporary majorities to stifle
unpopular opinions and oppress minorities. The Framers, concerned
primarily with thwarting the threat of tyranny in any form, built a
Constitution that enshrined as supreme law our uniquely American
skeptical optimism. Including a judiciary both entirely insulated
from political influence and equipped with interpretive authority
was the keystone to the achievement of the Constitutions devised
ends. Without a countermajoritarian judiciary armed with the pow-
er of judicial review, the entire design of our national government
would be meaningless. Unfortunately, neither the departmentalists
197. See KRAMER, supra note 1, at 8; TUSHNET, supra note 8, at 194; see also Robert Post
& Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92
CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1028-29 (2004). As Professors Prakash and Yoo have noted, the line
between departmentalism and popular constitutionalism is blurry, in large part because the
scholars who worked to formulate these theories have often only vaguely defined them.
Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretive Supremacy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1539,
1543-44 (2005) (reviewing KRAMER, supra note 1).
198. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (placing all judicial power in the Supreme Court and in
any inferior courts established by Congress and granting life tenure to judges of such courts).
199. See CHOPER, supra note 36, at 5-7.
200. See ELY, supra note 85, at 181 (arguing that the core idea at the heart of American
constitutionalism is democracy and that organizing our country around democratic principles
is normatively desirable).
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nor the popular constitutionalists recognize this foundational in-
sight.
1. Departmentalism: A Historical and Doctrinal Argument
Against Judicial Supremacy
Departmentalism, in its various forms, denies that the judiciary
is supreme in saying what the law is,201 and instead asserts that
each departmentlegislative, executive, and judicialhas equal
authority to engage in constitutional interpretation in fulfilling its
respective constitutional role and performing its assigned duties.202
This theory is based on the idea of coordinacy: our system, they
argue, is primarily designed to achieve the independent, coordinate
status of coequal branches.203 Accordingly, the three coordinate
branches were intended to serve as checks on one another, and no
single one was meant to reign over the other two.204 At its core,
departmentalism is focused on undermining the role of the judiciary
as the ultimate arbiter of constitutional meaning and on locating
that final interpretive authority in the executive branch.205
Departmentalisms most vocal and extreme proponent, Michael
Stokes Paulsen, begins by arguing that the President has a large
degree of interpretive power.206 He says the rationales for executive
review are the same as the rationales for judicial review set forth in
Marbury v. Madison and The Federalist No. 78.207 Those rationales,
he argues, explain why executive review is equally as valid in the
context of vetoes and pardons as it is in faithful execution of the law
and the enforcement of judicial final judgments.208 Paulsen then
asserts that because the rationale for executive review is the same
as the rationale for judicial review, any counterarguments against
201. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
202. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 1, at 221, 325.
203. See id. at 228-29, 235.
204. See id. at 221, 325.
205. See id. at 221.
206. See id. at 219-20.
207. Id. at 241-45.
208. Id. at 224; see also Eisgruber, supra note 196, at 348 (agreeing with Paulsen that Chief
Justice Marshalls logic in Marbury can be said to justify executive review just as capably as
it explains judicial review, and that judicial supremacy is thus not the exclusive outcome of
his reasoning).
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executive review are equally applicable to judicial review.209 One
cannot believe in one without believing in the other, he reasons, and
the ultimate power of judicial review cannot be supreme to the
power of executive review without undermining the argument for
judicial review in the first place.210 Thus, because the judiciary lacks
the authority to execute its own final judgments, it is the executive
that holds the ultimate power of interpretation. According to Profes-
sor Paulsen, this should mean that the President can defy judicial
rulings without upsetting the constitutional balance of powers.211
This view problematically understands coordinacy to require that
the executive branch possess the same type of power as the judici-
ary, when in fact coordinacy requires only that the branches possess
the same quantum of constitutional authority.212 By this we mean
that the mere fact that the branches are designed to possess equal
levels of power in no way necessarily implies that they possess iden-
tical power. Indeed, no one suggests that the judiciary has power to
assert executive power vested by Article II in the President. There
is, then, no reason to assume that the executive logically must
possess the equivalent of the judiciarys authority. Framers wrote
about the concept of coordinacy in The Federalist, but it was a
means to the structural end that became our Constitution.213 It is
209. See Paulsen, supra note 1, at 224.
210. Id. at 224; see also Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Protestantism in Theory and
Practice: Two Questions for Michael Stokes Paulsen and One for His Critics, 83 GEO. L.J. 373,
373 (1994) (agreeing that the logic of judicial review applies in equal measure to executive
review); cf. Geoffrey P. Miller, The Presidents Power of Interpretation: Implications of a
Unified Theory of Constitutional Law, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 35, 40 (1993) (The
Constitution itself does not subordinate the president to the courts in matters of constitu-
tional interpretation. On the contrary, the text and structure of the Constitution establish the
president as head of a coordinate branch of the government.).
211. Paulsen, supra note 1, at 266-67.
212. See Eisgruber, supra note 196, at 352. Professor Eisgruber urges a reading of Marbury
that favors neither judicial supremacy nor institutional coordinacy, but that instead views the
duty of constitutional interpretation as pragmatically vested to varying degrees in each of the
three branches of government according to their comparative institutional competence. Id.
As we argue throughout this Section, Professor Eisgruber is right to challenge Professor
Paulsens view that institutional coordinacy requires identity of power in the three coequal
branches. However, Professor Eisgruber is as off base as Professor Paulsen insofar as he
argues that judicial supremacy is not part and parcel of American constitutionalism, and his
pragmatism comes at the expense of principle.
213. Paulsen, supra note 1, at 229 (It is the idea of coordinacy, even more than the cognate
concept of separation on which it depends and builds, that fuels the system of checks and
balances that guards against a tyrannical concentration of all the powers of government in
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folly to suggest that the separation of powers and the system of
checks and balances that the Framers built to advance the goal of
coordinacy allow the executive to control the entirety of our legal
process, empowering it to (1) choose whether to execute the law as
promulgated by Congress; (2) execute that law; and (3) ignore an
Article III courts judgment as to that laws constitutionality.214 This
seems to be the very definition of a tyrannical concentration of all
the powers of government in the same hands215what James
Madison viewed as the primary evil our Constitution would need to
guard against.216
Interestingly, it is Madisons own written expressions of commit-
ment to the notion of coequal authority that, Paulsen argues,
demonstrate the validity of departmentalism.217 Paulsen acknowl-
edges that Madison eventually conceded that judicial interpretation
would typically constitute the final resolution of constitutional
issues because the judiciary generally would be the last branch to
act on a particular question by virtue of the order in which the
branches respective powers would be exercised.218 Yet Paulsen
insists that Madison adopted this position reluctantly while remain-
ing committed to the concept of coordinacy, and that just because
the judiciary would often interpret last did not necessarily require
the same hands. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 20 (James Madison))).
214. This recalls the maxim nemo iudexin sua causa, the oft-recited axiom that no man
should be a judge in his own case. See Dr. Bonhams Case (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652; 8 Co.
Rep. 113 b, 118 a (Lord Coke, C.J.); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176
(1803) (To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation
committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be
restrained?); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798). Professor Adrian Vermeule has
challenged whether this mantra espouses a bedrock principle of natural justice and
constitutionalism. Adrian Vermeule, Contra Nemo Iudex in Sua Causa: The Limits of
Impartiality, 122 YALE L.J. 384, 384 (2012). But considering the core principle of skeptical
optimism we have identified as central to American constitutionalismand considering the
catholic devotion our Supreme Court has shown to the concept through frequent reference to
and reliance upon itso sharp a contradiction is striking.
215. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 20, at 312 (James Madison).
216. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 20, at 125 (James Madison) (When a majority
is included in a faction, the form of popular government ... enables it to sacrifice to its ruling
passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public
good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve
the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries
are directed.).
217. Paulsen, supra note 1, at 221-22.
218. Id. at 235.
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that its interpretation should bind.219 Empowering the judiciary
with the authority to bind other branches by its interpretation,
Paulsen contends, would contravene The Federalist No. 49s in-
struction that no branch was to have an exclusive or superior right
of settling the boundaries between their respective powers.220
Ultimately, [t]o hold that one branchs interpretation controls
another is to bestow a practical and real omnipotence on the con-
trolling branch.... [T]o grant the courts interpretive supremacy
would be to give them a practical and real omnipotence.221
Departmentalists such as Paulsen fail to understand that the
whole point of coordinacy, especially as it is implemented through
our Constitution, is countermajoritarianism.222 The structural allo-
cation of power set forth in the Constitution, the series of checks
and balances it provides, and the salary and tenure protections it
grants the judiciary all exist to ensure that both the document and
the courts serve countermajoritarian roles.223 It makes eminent
sense for the sole branch that is insulated from majoritarian pres-
sures to render the final and binding interpretive judgments of the
foundational countermajoritarian document. If the very major-
itarian bodies that the Constitution limits may have final say as to
the meaning of those limits, the Constitution is no limit at all.224 It
would make no sense for checked branches to have the final say as
to what the checks on them mean.225 The judiciary is the least
219. Id. at 235-36.
220. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, supra note 20, at 313 (James Madison).
221. Paulsen, supra note 1, at 244.
222. Cf. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 13, at 720 (arguing that Madisons primary
goal in designing the structural Constitution was to establish a series of supermajoritarian
lawmaking apparatuses).
223. See Steven G. Calabresi, Textualism and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1373, 1373 (1998) (The constitutional texts overarching concern is with
questions of institutional competence, and its main theme is the division and allocation of
power with a focus on who decides what questions and [is] subject to what checks and
balances.).
224. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 20, at 438 (Alexander Hamilton) (By a limited
Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative
authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no expost facto laws,
and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through
the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the
manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights
or privileges would amount to nothing.).
225. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803) (describing the
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dangerous branch226 insofar as it has no power to execute or
legislate. It therefore makes sense, structurally, to give final in-
terpretive authority of the Constitution to the branch least capable
of compulsion or coercion, and to insulate that branch from the evils
of temporary political movement. This is what makes the branches
coordinate. Put another way, without judicial supremacy, coordinacy
would be impossible. Without the authority to exercise its
countermajoritarian power and definitively determine what the law
is, the judiciary would not be merely the least dangerous branch
it would arguably be no branch at all. At the very least, it would be
impossible to call it a coordinate branch.
It is no coincidence that the judiciary is the last branch to analyze
the constitutionality of legislation. Departmentalists seem to view
it as a happy accident that the judiciary gets the final word because
it typically happens to decide constitutional questions last in time.
But none of this is coincidental. The Framers created a republic
with a legislative branch possessing limited power whose job it is to
promulgate legislation that both complies with the Constitution and
serves majoritarian interests.227 To avoid placing too much power in
one single branch of government, the Constitution denied the legis-
lative branch power to execute those laws, placing executive power
in the hands of the executive branch.228 And ultimately, after the
legislature passed a law and the President executed it, a third
branch would be able to pass on the laws legality.229
Interestingly, Professor Paulsen diverges from other critics of
judicial supremacy by drawing a distinction between judicial su-
premacy and judicial review.230 Professor Paulsen does not argue
Constitution as setting forth limited government, and explaining that those limits are
meaningless if the majoritarian branches may transcend them at any time).
226. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1986).
227. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176-77 (explaining that the United States gov-
ernment is a limited government that is partly comprised of a legislature that has defined,
limited powers).
228. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (vesting executive power in the President, not in the
legislature).
229. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177-78 (noting that it is the judiciarys duty to say
what the law is and to determine the constitutionality of certain actions taken by the other
branches).
230. Paulsen, supra note 1, at 240 (recognizing that judicial review exists, but that the
executives power to determine the constitutionality of acts is of equal power and authority,
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against judicial review. In fact, he pledges a degree of allegiance to
the idea, explicating Marbury v. Madisons logic and explaining why
it also supports his theory.231 He calls his analytical method Euclid-
ean232: Marbury, he says, rests on (1) the major premise that when
ordinary law conflicts with the Constitution, the Constitution pre-
vails; and (2) the minor premise that the judiciary has the authority
to interpret the rule of law in the course of applying the rule of
law.233
Instead of arguing against judicial review, he asserts that both
the major and minor premises of Marbury support his theory that
the judiciary is not the exclusive arbiter of constitutional interpre-
tation.234 After all, the President and Congress take an oath just like
the judiciary to protect and defend the Constitution;235 they are in
an equally good position to interpret the law as the judiciary. And
the executive applies the rule of law when it takes care to faithfully
execute the laws of the United States236the President, too, could
be deemed competent to interpret the laws he applies.
Professor Paulsens proof is anything but Euclidean. First, to say
that the coordinate branches are equally capable and equipped to
interpret the Constitution and say what the law is by virtue of the
ubiquity of oaths of office completely ignores the structural reality
that gave rise to judicial review in the first place. Yes, the President
and Congress also take an oath to protect and defend the Constitu-
tion, and should act within its bounds at all times. In a vacuum, the
idea of coordinacy would suggest that all three branches should
have the exact same power to determine what those bounds are. But
that is in a vacuum, and the vacuum ignores the harsh political
realities of our system. The President and Congress are not only
accountable to the Constitution; they are, by design, accountable as
well to their constituents. The judiciary, in contrast, was uniquely
thus meaning that judicial supremacy does not exist).
231. Id. at 244-45.
232. Id. at 226.
233. Id. at 242-43.
234. Id. at 244-45.
235. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (requiring the President to take an oath prior
to entering office which states, in part, that the President will preserve, protect and defend
the Constitution of the United States).
236. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8.
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and purposefully insulated from political influence.237 Its com-
mitment is to the Constitution alone, not to the people and their
constantly evolving majoritarian choices.238
The Framers choice reveals a commitment to judicial review, and
judicial review requires judicial supremacy. The simple and ines-
capable fact is that vesting final say as to the meaning of the
Constitution in a different branch effectively underminesif, in-
deed, it does not completely destroythe countermajoritarianism
that is so fundamental to our form of constitutionalism.
In his quest to demonstrate the validity and worth of executive
interpretation in our constitutional regime, Professor Paulsen urges
that the Constitution should be understood to permit the President
not only to interpret the Constitution when he takes care to faith-
fully execute the laws Congress promulgates, but also to refuse to
enforce particular judicial decrees.239 Analyzing James Wilsons
writings on the limits of judicial power, Paulsen writes:
The Constitution has given one rule. The Court, a subordinate
power, has given a contradictory rule. The former is the law of
the land; the court decision is void and has no operation. The
judicial infringement should not be abetted by the executive but
rather discountenanced and declared void. Unless one assumes
that the courts always interpret correctly, Wilsons defense of
judicial reviewlike Hamiltons and like Marshallsleads inex-
orably to the equal validity of executive review of the courts
decisions.240
Paulsens analysis suffers from a fatal circularity. Of course, he
is right that a courts decision that is counter to the Constitution is
237. See Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: Recon-
cilingModern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciarys Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1,
33-34 (2000) (describing the Federalists goal of insulating the judiciary from party politics).
238. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 20, at 440-41 (Alexander Hamilton) (dis-
cussing the importance of independent judges and their duties as faithful guardians of the
Constitution).
239. Paulsen, supra note 1, at 221-22; cf. Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The
Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1279-80 (1996)
(examining the textual bases for executive interpretation and urging that the President is
authorized to engage in constitutional interpretation independent from the judiciarys exercise
of interpretive authority).
240. Paulsen, supra note 1, at 254 (quoting 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 300 (Robert
Green McCloskey ed., 1967)).
1880 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1825
invalid because the Constitution is our supreme law and trumps any
action of a subordinate that the Constitution has itself ordained
with power.241 But to assume the courts decision is incorrect is to
beg the question: How are we to know, ex ante, that it is the Presi-
dents interpretation that is correct and the courts interpretation
that is incorrect? Moreover, we are left asking the same initial
question: How does the Constitution indicate that the President
should be empowered to determine whether the judiciary has given
a contradictory rule to the Constitution? When the judiciary in-
terprets the Constitution differently from the way the political
branches believe it should, the judiciary is not acting unconstitu-
tionally, much like a President who vetoes a bill because he does
not think the bill is constitutional (even though Congress or the
Court might) is not acting unconstitutionally.
There exists an even more fundamental problem with depart-
mentalist analysis: it ignores Lord Cokes famed warning that, for
obvious reasons, no man can be a judge in his own case.242 The idea
that a branch of government may have final say as to the constitu-
tionality of its own actions effectively guts any notion of limited
power, ignores the mutual mistrust that serves as the foundation for
the Constitution, and renders wholly illusory the concept of inter-
branch checking.243
Departmentalism can be framed slightly differently in order to
avoid some of our most direct criticisms, but such framing nonethe-
less ultimately leads to similar results. In a way, departmentalism
describes nothing more than the political question doctrine, pursu-
ant to which the Court occasionally refuses to rule on constitutional
challenges and instead defers to the branch whose actions have been
challenged.244 Professor Paulsen notes that the political question
241. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (It is also not entirely
unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the
constitution itself is first mentioned.).
242. See Dr. Bonhams Case (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652; 8 Co. Rep. 113 b, 118 a (Lord
Coke, C.J.).
243. The judiciary is, to some extent, an exception to this dictate because under the model
of judicial supremacy, the courts retain authority to determine the constitutionality of their
own actions. However, such an exception may be justified on a principle of necessity because
vesting the authority to determine the constitutionality of judicial action in the political
branches would effectively destroy the countermajoritarian check on the majoritarian
branches.
244. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 233, 235 (1993) (holding that the
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doctrine makes sense insofar as there are some things that should
evade judicial review and be left entirely to the executive to
determine.245 From there, he observes that scholars have rightly
pointed out how difficult it is to confine the political question doc-
trine to a clearly delimited collection of areas falling exclusively
within the executives purview of interpretation.246 Instead of view-
ing the blurred limits of the doctrines scope as indicative of its
fragility, he posits that there are no clear limits because executive
interpretive authority cannot be readily confined in a principled
fashion, and it should thus be functionally limitless.247
Rather than granting the political question doctrines logic and
holding that it must allow for majoritarian control over the interpre-
tation of our countermajoritarian Constitutionthe precise opposite
of the documents structural visionwe suggest that the judiciary
is fit to police the boundaries actually contained within the Constitu-
tion or necessary to achieve its structural aims. True, the political
question doctrine is problematic because it claims that some consti-
tutional provisions do not lend themselves to clear and measurable
standards, but it makes no principled distinction between those
provisions that can be distilled down to standards and tests and
those that cannot.248 A more logical form of the political question
doctrine asks only whether the text of the Constitution explicitly
places the action or decision in question within the cognizance of the
judiciary, or is instead agnostic as to the manner in which a par-
ticular constitutionally granted power is exercised. For example, a
court may consider whether the executive has complied with the
Constitutions directive that the President may block legislation by
veto, for in saying what the Constitution means, the Court will be
forced to determine the meaning of the term veto within Article
II.249 But Article II is agnostic as to permissible rationales for
question of whether the Senate had properly tried an impeachment was a political question
that was to be left entirely to the Senate because under the Constitution it alone had the
power to try impeachments).
245. Paulsen, supra note 1, at 286.
246. Id. at 286-87.
247. Id. at 287.
248. See Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the Political Question, 79 NW. U. L. REV.
1031, 1045-46 (1985).
249. Indeed, the Supreme Court nearly did pass on this issue. In Barnes v. Kline, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the President had unsuccessfully
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exercising the veto power.250 Nowhere does it indicate that a validly
effectuated veto may be issued only for good cause or that a
President must reasonably believe the statute is unconstitutional;
nowhere does it indicate any criteria whatsoever.251
Suppose Congress passed a bill forbidding flag burning and the
President, remembering the holding of Texas v. Johnson,252 decided
he would veto the bill because he deemed it unconstitutional.
Suppose further that the way the President chose to veto the bill
was by sticking it in his desk drawer, climbing to the roof of the
White House, and shouting into a loudspeaker, Today feels like
a good day to veto some unconstitutional legislation! No other
branch is empowered to determine whether the Presidents ra-
tionales are correct or motivations are pure when the President
vetoes the legislation. That is because the Constitution does not
provide that the President may veto bills only when those bills defy
the Constitution; instead, it simply empowers the President to veto
bills, presumably for whatever reason he deems appropriate.253 The
Constitution requires that the President actually veto those bills in
order to block their passage, so it seems logical for the courts to pass
on whether the Presidents method of effectuating his intent to veto
constitutes a veto according to the text of the Constitution. But it
is the Constitutions unambiguous provision of the veto power un-
conditionally to the President that removes the question of the
legitimacy of the motivating force from the Courts purview.
This is the most important point. When the political branches
exceed their constitutional authority, they pose a great risk to the
people and to ourconstitutional regime.254 Our structural Constitution
vetoed a bill when he pocket vetoed legislation that would condition continued military aid
to El Salvador on the President certifying El Salvadors progress towards protecting human
rights. 759 F.2d 21, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S.
361 (1987). Because the legislation expired before the case arrived at the Supreme Court, the
Court reversed the D.C. Circuit on mootness grounds. Burke, 479 U.S. at 363-65.
250. This is because the Framers left the Presidents veto power open ended, merely stating
its existence and not the reasons for its usage. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
251. See Carl McGowan, The Presidents Veto Power: An Important Instrument of Conflict
in Our Constitutional System, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 791, 792 (1986).
252. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
253. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
254. See Elizabeth Price Foley, Presidents Cannot Ignore Laws as Written, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/01/29/presidential-power-vs-
congressional-inertia/presidents-cannot-ignore-laws-as-written?emc=eta1 [https://perma.cc/
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seems to understand this by ordaining a judiciary branch as the
final arbiter of the constitutionality of government action.255 But the
judicial branch is completely insulated from majoritarian impulses
and political pressure, and it has authority over neither purse nor
sword.256 It is unlikely to breach its constitutional duty because, at
least for the most part, political pressuresthe winds that blow the
political branches toward ultra vires actiondo not exist for judicial
officers in our government.257 And even if the courts do breach their
duties, such breach carries with it relatively limited risk to our in-
stitutional structure because the judiciary is so strapped for
power.258 This is why, for example, the courts are in the appropriate
position to define the bounds of their own jurisdiction while Con-
gress is not in the appropriate position to define the bounds of its
own power. Frankly, necessity requires that someone define the
contours of these powers. But our structural Constitution under-
stands that the judiciary is less positioned to undermine the system
than are the political branches.259
Does this mean that there exists absolutely no danger of judicial
excess? Surely it would be wrong to make such an assumption. The
era of the Supreme Courts specious economic substantive due pro-
cess during the early twentieth century certainly stands as evidence
to the contrary.260 But at least in a relative sense, this danger is far
less likely to lead to embedded tyranny than excesses by one or both
BC8U-2THR] (When one branch of government exceeds its authority, separation of powers
is violated, and representative government breaks down.).
255. See William H. Rehnquist, Whither the Courts, 60 A.B.A. J. 787, 787 (1974).
256. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 20, at 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (The
judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse.).
257. Even the judiciary is not entirely insulated from the power of popular majority, as the
Appointments Clause vests the President with the authority to appoint federal judicial officers
with the advice and consent of the Senate. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also Jack M.
Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV.
1045,1068(2001) (Partisan entrenchment through presidential appointments to the judiciary
is the best account of how the meaning of the Constitution changes over time through Article
III interpretation rather than through Article V amendment.).
258. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 20, at 437 (Alexander Hamilton) ([The
judiciary] may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment; and must
ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.).
259. See id.
260. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (determining that the liberty
of contract was implicit in the Due Process Clause and that Congresss ability to regulate
employment and working conditions was severely limited).
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of the political branches. Whatever the Court does or does not hold,
the majoritarian branches invariably will possess far more power.261
Moreover, eventually the makeup of the Court will change to reflect
the views of current majorities.262 At the very least, unlike the poli-
tical branches (particularly the executive), it is all but inconceivable
that the judiciary will seize power and impose tyrannical rule by
exercising brute force.
Professor Paulsen insists that as long as the President has
complete power to veto or pardon based on his interpretation of the
Constitution, it must be true that the President has interpretive and
thus discretionary authority as to the execution of statutes, abid-
ance to judicial precedent, and the enforcement of judicial decrees
in specific cases.263 He argues that there is no principled distinction
warranting interpretation of the Constitution to accord absolute
authority to the executive regarding vetoes and pardons while deny-
ing such authority elsewhere, and that executive defiance of judicial
interpretation in the context of a veto is just as nefarious as in the
context of legislation or court decree.264 If Supreme Court prece-
dents are otherwise supreme in the sense of being binding law for
the other branches, he writes, then the Presidents refusal to
adhere to such law simply because the courts cannot (or will not)
review his actions does not make those actions lawful and legiti-
mate, but rather the cynical actions of a Holmesian bad man.265 But
once again, his reasoning is faulty.
It makes sense that the President possesses complete control
over a veto or pardon so long as it is done by constitutionally valid
means.266 The Constitution gives the President the Power to Grant
Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States,
except in Cases of Impeachment,267 and empowers the President to
261. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 20, at 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (comparing
the power of the legislature and executive to the power of the judiciary, and arguing that the
judiciary has less power).
262. See David G. Barnum, The Supreme Court and Public Opinion: Judicial Decision
Makingin the Post-New Deal Period, 47 J. POL. 652, 664 (noting that research supports the
view that the Supreme Courts decisions and ideological makeup follow the election returns).
263. Paulsen, supra note 1, at 266.
264. See id. at 264-67.
265. Id. at 266.
266. See id. at 264-65.
267. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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consider bills approved by both houses of Congress: If he approve
he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to
that House in which it shall have originated.268 Neither of these
provisions affixes a legal obligation to the Presidents discretion; if
he so chooses, he may pardon an offender against the United States
based on that offenders hair color, and he may veto legislation for
using verbiage he finds irritatingeven in spite of the laws likely
efficacy, social utility, and obvious compliance with constitutional
law.269
However, the President lacks similar discretion in deciding
whether or not to execute the law. The President is obligated to
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.270 Read in con-
junction with the Supremacy Clause,271 it is sensible to conclude
that this constitutional dictate requires that the President execute
the law of the land unless higher law requires otherwise. If the
President can justifiably assert that the ordinary federal law he re-
fuses to execute is unconstitutional, then the President is faithfully
executing the law by adhering to the Constitution. But if a court
empowered to interpret and enforce the Constitution decrees in the
adjudication of a case or controversy that the law in question is in
fact constitutional, the President may no longer rely on his position
that the law is unconstitutional as a justification for his refusal to
enforce it.272 To allow the President to continue in his refusal would
provide an easy subterfuge for any President who is politically
disinclined to enforce a particular statute.
Departmentalisms entire foundationthat the theory of coordi-
nacy empowers the executive to ignore the judiciarys interpretation
of the Constitution in favor of its ownthus sprouts from poisoned
roots. When the President interprets the Constitution in the course
of vetoing or pardoning, he does so in the context of a process of con-
stitutionally delegated decision making that, according to the docu-
ment, requires no lawful motive or explanation. By contrast, when
the President executes ordinary legislation, he does so in the process
of taking care that the lawsall of them, including especially and
268. Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
269. See McGowan, supra note 251, at 807-08.
270. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
271. Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
272. See supra Part I.B.
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supremely the Constitutionare faithfully executed. Contrary to
Professor Paulsens argument, whether the President may refuse to
execute a statute has nothing to do with how important or valuable
certain constitutional grounds might be.273
The President is presumably empowered to refuse to execute a
law that he reasonably believes does not comport with the Constitu-
tions instructions. That is what it means to faithfully execute the
law: if the President is faithful to his oath, his office, and the Consti-
tution, he will refuse to execute inferior laws not authorized by the
supreme law of the land. But if the courts have declared that the in-
ferior law is constitutional, he cannot simply ignore such a decree
and refuse to execute the law.274
This also explains why judicial review resulting in a declaration
of unconstitutionality must bind the executive. In the exercise of its
authority to adjudicate cases and controversies, the judiciary is
necessarily tasked with the final round of interpretation and decla-
ration of what the law is. The judiciary exists as a check upon the
legislative and executive branches, for if they are so consumed by
popular sentiment or momentary majoritarian interests that they
promulgate inferior law that is noncompliant with the Constitution,
the judiciary can protect minority and countermajoritarian inter-
ests by declaring the inferior law invalid.275 If the executive can defy
this pronouncement, the judiciary becomes functionally irrelevant;
it is then a mere instrument of the executive designed to offer advi-
sory opinions that the President may acknowledge or ignore.
Thus, the established implications of Article IIIs case-or-contro-
versy requirement inescapably dictate that the Presidentlike
everyone elsemust comply with a courts order that is the product
of an adverse adjudication based on that courts interpretation of
the Constitution.276 Otherwise, the speculative nature of the
Presidents response fatally denies that decision the element of re-
dressability that is an essential element of the judiciarys authority
to act pursuant to Article IIIs case-or-controversy requirement.277
When the Court declares a law constitutional, the President might
273. Contra Paulsen, supra note 1, at 270-71.
274. Contra id. at 276-77.
275. See supra Part I.B.
276. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
277. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 568 (1992).
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have the opportunity in future cases to refuse to execute that law
on the grounds that an as-applied challenge would succeed. In other
words, the executive may continue, in a way, to check the judiciary
where the judiciary permits legislative and executive action. But
where the judiciary rejects legislative and executive action as
unconstitutionalthat is, serves its countermajoritarian purpose
providing for an executive override completely contravenes the
Constitutions structural design.
If the Supreme Court rules a particular presidential action uncon-
stitutional, is the President constitutionally bound not to take the
identical action against a distinct private party under parallel
circumstances? Assuming the two situations are, in fact, legally
identical, it is probably accurate to conclude that the President is
bound in this manner on both ethical and moral levels.278 As a
constitutional matter, however, it is probable that the President
technically is not bound in case two to refrain from even identical
behavior found unconstitutional in case one. Using Holmess bad
man theory,279 perhaps the President can play hardball by comply-
ing only with a direct order of the court.280 But at worst, such
presidential behavior would require the private challenger to pursue
case two to resolution, which would of course lead to the same
conclusion as in case one. Alternatively, the President could be
subjected to an equitable class action,281 thereby subjecting the
President to a formal court order controlling her behavior as a
general matter. But it is important to recognize that even were the
President permitted to play the law so close to the line, in the end
she remains subject to judicial directive, thereby maintaining ju-
dicial supremacy.
Not everyone who sympathizes with Paulsens theory of executive
interpretive power is prepared to reject judicial supremacy while
granting the value or correctness of judicial review itself. Professor
278. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires an attorney of record to sign
every pleading and motion certifying that the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions
are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or
reversing existing law or for establishing new law and that the document is not being
presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly
increase the cost of litigation. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1)-(2).
279. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
280. Contra Paulsen, supra note 1, at 266.
281. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (providing for class-wide injunctive relief).
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Steven Calabresi, for example, has applauded Professor Paulsen
for making clear that the President has just as much a right and
obligation to interpret the Constitution as do the courts,282 but em-
phatically rejects the notion that the executive can simply offer its
own interpretation and ignore the judiciary once a court issues judg-
ment in a case.283 We agree that Professor Paulsens argument is
plainly wrong, and that, as Professor John McGinnis has also
pointed out, such a design would render the judiciary meaningless
and place it in a position of merely offering advisory opinions,284
which we know to be contrary to the judiciarys constitutionally or-
dained mission and purpose.285 But given our understanding of the
term, we believe it is inaccurate to characterize scholars like Cal-
abresi or McGinnis as true departmentalists. Far and away the
most controversial element of the theory is Paulsens assertion that,
because the executive and the judiciary are to be deemed equal as
constitutional interpreters, the President may ignore judicial deci-
sions interpreting the Constitution when he disagrees.286 Because
both Calabresi and McGinnis understand and accept the authority
of a court to bind the President to its constitutional interpretation,
their approach does not differ substantially from the foundational
elements of the traditionalist model.287
2. Popular Constitutionalism: A Normative Attack on Judicial
Supremacy
Other opponents of judicial supremacy make a different argu-
ment: regardless of whether the Constitution can be read to provide
for judicial review, judicial supremacy does not protect the virtues
we think it does or should, and entrusting either the people or their
282. Calabresi, supra note 196, at 1421.
283. See id. at 1424-25; cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as BindingLaw and as
Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 79 (1993) (challenging the scholarly
justifications supporting both executive acquiescence and executivenonacquiescence theories).
284. See John O. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General: A
Normative, Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 375, 394-95 (1993).
285. See Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the Case-
or-Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
545, 567 (2006).
286. See Paulsen, supra note 1, at 321; see also Calabresi, supra note 196, at 1422.
287. See Calabresi, supra note 196, at 1425; McGinnis, supra note 284, at 391-92.
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chosen representativesthe President or Congresswith interpre-
tive authority would be preferable because such a practice aligns
more closely with our first principles and is grounded in precepts of
representative democracy.288 Pioneered by Larry Kramer, its most
vocal and consistent champion, popular constitutionalism (again, in
various forms) struggles to combat the descriptive truths of the
structural Constitution by devoting little energy to description and
focusing almost exclusively on observational and normative argu-
ment. Professor Kramer argues that the notion of judicial suprem-
acy is highly antagonistic to the democratic values that are core to
the American vision, supported only by aristocrats289 who have
deep-seated misgivings about ordinary citizens290 and view demo-
cratic politics as scary and threatening.291 Accordingly, he urges
that final interpretive authority be given to the people themselves,
who should have active and ongoing control over the interpretation
and enforcement of constitutional law.292
Comparison of Professor Kramers approach to the true founda-
tions of our form of constitutional democracy readily demonstrates
the serious flaws in his analysis. The very notion of a countermajor-
itarian Constitution belies Professor Kramers normative claim.
Permitting governmental branches that are electorally responsive
to majority impulses to exercise interpretive authority is inherently
dangerous, for those branches cannot be constrained by a constitu-
tional document whose limitations they can freely interpret without
consequence.293 Transferring interpretive authority to the diffuse
288. See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 8, at 16 (arguing that the Constitution has not lived
up to its promise and proposing a shift to a new constitutional regime with more limited
judicial power); Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV.
959, 960 (2004); Post & Siegel, supra note 197, at 1029; cf. David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections
as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047, 2050 (2010) (advocating for popular
constitutionalism based on the effectiveness of equivalent judicial majoritarianism in states
with elected judiciaries).
289. Kramer, supra note 288, at 1008.
290. Id. at 1005.
291. Id. at 1003.
292. Id. at 959.
293. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule
of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 694 (1995) ([C]onstitutionalism entails, among other impor-
tant things, protection of the individual and of minorities from democratic governance over
certain spheres. When those charged with checking the majority are themselves answerable
to, and thus influenced by, the majority, the question arises how individual and minority
protection is secured.).
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and unidentifiable mass that is the Peoplea concept left con-
sistently vague in Kramers analysiscarries with it similar
definitional dangers while also being virtually impossible to imple-
ment or confine.294 One need look no further than the several states
with elected judiciaries to observe the troubling juxtaposition of
tasking politically accountable judges with neutral adjudication and
constitutional interpretation.295
The argument Kramer and others advance is not only norma-
tively unpersuasive, it is also logically untenable in light of the
structural Constitution and the basic premises of American consti-
tutionalism. As we explained in Part I, the traditionalist view
understands the value of countermajoritarian checking as a political
mechanism for enshrining skeptical optimism, which can be readily
deduced from the Constitutions structural design. Our constitu-
tionalism is thus principally concerned with facilitating democracy
while promoting rule of law values and protecting minorities.296 The
reality is that any argument that temporary majoritiesor the
governmental bodies that are directly accountable to those major-
itiesare either more capable or more suitable arbiters of constitu-
tional meaning ignores the careful framework for promoting these
values that was etched into our supreme law at the constitutional
convention. Our proclaimed unflagging commitment to due process
294. See Prakash & Yoo, supra note 197, at 1546 (None of the popular actions Kramer
lauds, however, enables the people to regularly establish the Constitutions meaning. Voting,
petitioning, and mobbing permit people to express their general preferences, but they do not
enable the people to clearly express the fine distinctions often necessary in constitutional
law.); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: A Reply to Professor
Kramer, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1013, 1015 (2004) (Failing to define his crucial concept ... not only
permits an abstract, glorified view of the public, it also obscures what is fundamentally at
risk: weakening constitutional limits on the actions of elected and unelected officials; eroding
constitutional protections for unpopular, marginalized groups; increasing discordant consti-
tutional interpretations across the branches of the federal government and the states; and
relegating constitutional interpretation by the judiciary to advisory status within the federal
scheme.).
295. See generally Martin H. Redish & Jennifer Aronoff, The Real Constitutional Problem
with State Judicial Selection: Due Process, Judicial Retention, and the Dangers of Popular
Constitutionalism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2014) (describing the ways the majoritarian
process of election and retention of state court judges runs counter to the American concept
of due process of law).
296. See Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Habeas Corpus, Due Process and the
Suspension Clause: A Study in the Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 96 VA. L. REV.
1361, 1366 (2010). See generally ELY, supra note 85.
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of law, the existence of a supreme document ratified by superma-
joritarian movement and subject to formal alteration only through
a supermajoritarian process, and our provision of a politically in-
sulated judiciary are all brightly flashing signals that our system
understands the importance of speed bumps to slow majorities
down. Popular constitutionalism seems to forgetor intentionally
ignoreall of this.297
Mark Tushnets case against judicial supremacy directly takes
on Larry Alexanders and Frederick Schauers defense of judicial
review.298 Alexander and Schauer assert that without judicial su-
premacy we would have a system of interpretive anarchy on our
hands.299 The role of the Supreme Court, say Alexander and
Schauer, is to provide a single authoritative interpreter to which
others must defer, to serve the settlement function of the law.300
Tushnet responds that when it declares that Congress has over-
stepped its bounds, the Court justifies its behavior using the self-
interestedness of the Congress: Congress is self-interested when it
defines the scope of its own power. Members of Congress have an
interest in maximizing their own power by expanding their sphere
of power and responsibilities. Any decision [Congress] make[s], no
matter how fully deliberated, will be shaped, and perhaps distorted,
by this self-interest.301 But this is an objection equally available to
those who would question the Courts version of judicial supremacy,
because the judiciary is just as apt to act self-interestedly and ex-
pand its own power.302
This position runs directly contrary to the basic principles under-
lying the structural Constitution. Tushnets argument essentially
ignores the fact that the judiciary was built to be (1) limited in ac-
tive power, and (2) countermajoritarian, staffed by insulated judges
with salary and tenure protections. With the exception of issues
surrounding its own powers, the judiciary is uniquely positioned to
297. For a deeper treatment and critique of the popular constitutionalism espoused by
Professors Kramer, Pozen, and Siegel, see Redish & Aronoff, supra note 295, at 39-46.
298. TUSHNET, supra note 8, at 27-30.
299. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation,
110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1378-79 (1997); see also Frederick Schauer, Judicial Supremacy and
the Modest Constitution, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (2004).
300. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 299, at 1378 n.80.
301. TUSHNET, supra note 8, at 26.
302. Id.
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serve as the neutral adjudicator that can settle disputes as to the
boundaries between executive and legislative, as well as federal and
state branches. More importantly, if the judiciary were not tasked
with settling the boundaries of majoritarian power, there would be
no countermajoritarian check at all, and the Constitution would
essentially be meaningless. And even as to its own power, the
Courts authorityunlike that of Congress or the Presidentis con-
fined to a passive role, awaiting cases to adjudicate.303 It therefore
makes sense to give the Court final say as to its own constitutional
power in order to protect its countermajoritarian role.304
Under a regime of judicial supremacy, the judiciary is no more
capable of aggrandizement than is Congress. Professor Tushnet
looks to City of Boerne v. Flores to show how the Court gives def-
erence to Congress and assumes laws are constitutional because
Congress has a duty to support the Constitution, but the Court does
not give deference to congressional redefinitions of its own power
because Congress is self-interested.305 But, he argues, the Court is
no less self-interested because every institution with both power and
the ability to aggrandize it will seek to expand or enhance that
power.306
Both of Professor Tushnets proof points are flawed. The Court is
no more empowered to engage in self-aggrandizement than is Con-
gress, considering that Congress is arguably capable of simply strip-
ping the federal courts of jurisdiction (within constitutional limits)
whenever it chooses.307 Why would it be, under Tushnets theory,
303. See Redish & Kastanek, supra note 285, at 549 (As the one branch not representative
of or accountable to the populace, the judiciary may threaten core democratic values unless
its actions are tied to performance of the traditional judicial function of dispute resolution. To
allow the judiciary to act in any other manner threatens to usurp the lawmaking and law-
enforcing powers of the other two branches of the federal government. Moreover, given the
judiciarys inherently passive role in the adversary system, absent the incentives to compile
and present evidence and argument created by the adverseness requirement, we cannot be
assured that a court will have sufficient information to enforce the laws fashioned by the
other branches.).
304. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
305. TUSHNET, supra note 8, at 26 (observing the Courts view that Congress is inherently
self-interested when defining its own power, but that [w]hen Congress acts within its sphere
of power and responsibilities, it has not just the right but the duty to make its own informed
judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 535 (1997))).
306. Id.
307. The extent of congressional power in this realm is, of course, a hotly debated topic.
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that the Framers would devise a constitutional system in which the
Congress could be trusted to determine the scope of its own power,
disregarding judicial pronouncements of the limits of that power,
and then could strip the courts of jurisdiction to hear any challenges
to such self-aggrandizement? Tushnet has effectively written Article
III out of the Constitution. And although he focuses his attention on
the fact that the Court is no more a single authoritative inter-
preter than is Congressor maybe even less singular, because each
individual voice is so much more meaningful on the
Court308Tushnet forgets that Congress represents hundreds of
millions of people and is, at some level, subject to their momentary
preferences. What makes the Court uniquely capable of serving as
the final voice of constitutional interpretationthe single au-
thoritative interpreter that Alexander and Schauer describe and
that the Framers envisionedis that it is insulated from such po-
litical pressure.309
Arguing that judicial supremacy distorts legislation, Professor
Tushnet suggests that without it, Congress would act more respons-
ibly in interpreting and abiding by the Constitution.310 For example,
in the context of flag burning, he contends that judicial supremacy
problematically prevented Congress from doing what its members
and the people wantednamely, passing an effective law against
the burning of the American flag.311 But that is exactly the point.
Presumably by the exact same reasoning, it could have been argued
that during the McCarthy era, the judiciary should not have been
allowed to prevent the majority from doing what it wanted to do
namely, suppress left-wing dissenters. The entire purpose of our
structural Constitution is to embed Founding-era American skep-
tical optimism and force the majority, if it wishes to circumvent
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separatingthe Two Tiers of
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U.L.REV. 205 (1985); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping
Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043 (2010); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit
the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953);
Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of
Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 51-52
(1975); Louise Weinberg, The Article III Box: The Power of Congress to Attack the Juris-
diction of Federal Courts, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1405 (2000).
308. TUSHNET, supra note 8, at 27-30.
309. See id. at 28.
310. Id. at 60.
311. Id.
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those fundamental truths, to garner enough supermajoritarian sup-
port to change them. If the American people are so concerned with
flag burning, it is a good thing to require them to amend the Con-
stitutionformally, by means of the prescribed supermajoritarian
process312to render constitutional those state or federal laws that
ban it. If burning the flag is a method of expression, and laws
forbidding it are contrary to the First Amendment because of their
communicative impact, the people may amend the Constitution to
declare that flag-burning laws are an exception to the Amendments
general coverage.313 Tushnet believes that lawmakers may apply
their own conception of the Constitution if they are conscientious
and if their interpretation is reasonable,314 but this begs the
question: Who is to decide whether a lawmaker has conscien-
tiously considered and reasonably interpreted the Constitution?
The lawmaker himself? Our constitutional democracy cannot sur-
vive such constant, momentary, self-interested reinterpretation.
Tushnet says it is wrong to assume that members of Congress are
inherently incapable of interpreting the Constitution.315 But the
traditionalist view of American constitutionalism in no way stands
for the position that Congress is incapable of properly exercising
interpretive authority. To the contrary, we both hope and assume
that Congress is doing just that in deciding whether to enact
legislation. The Constitution does not in any way prohibit the
majoritarian branches from ever exercising interpretive authority;
in fact, as Professor Paulsen discusses with great alacrity, each and
every politically accountable member of the federal government
takes an oath to support the Constitution.316
Congress might be undereducated about the Constitution, and it
might be that Congress would improve without the judiciary as a
backstop, especially if given the same kind of institutional support
312. See supra notes 122-33 and accompanying text (describing Bruce Ackermans theories
of informal amendment outside of Article Vs prescribed means of constitutional change).
313. See TUSHNET, supra note 8, at 58.
314. See id. at 33, 54-71.
315. See id. at 62-63.
316. Paulsen, supra note 1, at 257; see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3; Patrick O. Gudridge, The
Office of the Oath, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 387, 388-92 (2003) (discussing the historical impor-
tance of legislative and executive officer oath-taking). See generally MATTHEW A. PAULEY, I DO
SOLEMNLY SWEAR: THE PRESIDENTS CONSTITUTIONAL OATH (1999) (providing a historical
account of the Presidents oath and pledge to protect and defend the Constitution).
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that the executive receives in its endeavors of constitutional inter-
pretation, such as the Solicitor Generals Office and the Department
of Justices Office of Legal Counsel.317 But this misses the point
entirely. The problem is not that Congress is bad at constitutional
interpretationit is that because of its inherently majoritarian
nature, Congress is structurally incapable of effectively policing
majoritarian threats to the values and dictates embodied in the
countermajoritarian Constitution. This is especially true when Con-
gress itself creates those threats. Thus, our structural Constitution
does not envision Congress as the final interpreter, and for good
reason. The peoples elected representatives exist to advance the
current and future interests of their constituents; the courts exist to
ensure that those current and future legislative and policy choices
adhere to foundational principles embodied in the nations counter-
majoritarian supreme law.
III. FASHIONING THE THEORY OF PREMODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM
We urge a return to the once-cherished traditionalist approach
that for years stood unchallenged as accepted truth. Until the rise
of modernist theories of American constitutionalism, the traditional-
ist view was essentially assumed and thus went largely unexplained
and undefended. As we explained in Part I, the best defense of the
traditionalist understanding without reference to or reliance upon
later competing theories is through a focus on historical context and
a process of reverse engineering. The traditionalist view defines the
core of American constitutionalism as consisting of two fundamental
elements: the foundational principle of skeptical optimism (revealed
through examination of the historical context within which our
constitutional democracy was established), and its implementer, the
political apparatus of countermajoritarian checking of majoritarian
powers (revealed through reverse engineering from the structural
Constitution). Historical context suggests that the Constitution was
born out of skeptical optimism. We were optimistic that humankind
had great potential to flourish when empowered and encouraged to
work together and form movements. But at the same time, we were
dubious that majoritarian movements, if left unchecked, could avoid
317. See TUSHNET, supra note 8, at 61-62.
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devolving into chaos or tyranny. Reverse engineering from the
structures created in our Constitution, then, revealed the essence
of American constitutionalism to be countermajoritarian checking
of majoritarian governmental action. After all, no other reasonable
explanation exists for pledging commitment to representative gov-
ernment, creating powerful majoritarian legislative and executive
branches, and then establishing a judiciary that is insulated from
political pressure.
The traditionalist view of American constitutionalism under-
stands the import of both our written Constitution and prophylac-
tically insulated judicial review because those methods of activating
our form of constitutional governance logically connect to the princi-
ple and actuate the political apparatus. But without the benefit of
modernism as a foil, traditionalisms descriptive power can go only
so far in placing the principle and the apparatus at the core of
American constitutionalism. Standing on its own, the traditionalist
view is equipped only to observe the value, both normative and
structural, of each of the two methods of activation that the two
camps of modernists seek to undermine. As a descriptive matter,
nothing inherent to the traditionalist approach requires that these
mechanisms be deemed a part of the core of American constitution-
alism.
On the other hand, our premodern approach to understanding the
fundamental characteristics of American constitutionalism is de-
scriptive and analytical at every level. It recognizes the tripartite
core of our constitutionalism as consisting of principle, political
apparatus, and activating mechanisms. Historical context reveals
American skeptical optimism as the guiding principle. Structural
reverse engineering demonstrates that this skeptical optimism in-
exorably leads to countermajoritarian checking of majoritarian
power as the political apparatus at the heart of American consti-
tutionalism. Grasping the inherent fallacies that plague the moder-
nist analysis further demonstrates that the underlying principle
and apparatus are not the only aspects of American constitution-
alism inextricably tied to it. In fact, so too are the two particular
characteristics of the Constitution through which the principle and
apparatus are manifest: the Constitutions writtenness and the
provision of judicial review by a prophylactically insulated judiciary.
By responding to the various modernist alternatives, premodernism
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necessarily articulates the rationale for the formation of the tradi-
tionalist model while simultaneously pointing out the serious flaws
in models that have sought to displace it.
We believe that historical and contextual evidence strongly favors
the traditionalist view of American constitutionalism. But the virtue
of premodern constitutionalism is that, in addition to relying on
strong historical and contextual evidence, it draws strength from
consideration and rejection of competing modernist theories. In this
sense, those of us who believe in the notion of constitutional text as
the countermajoritarian supreme law that is to be definitively inter-
preted and enforced by a prophylactically insulated judiciary owe a
backhanded thanks to the modernist theorists with whom we so
strongly disagree. In the classic Millian sense in which true ideas
become sharper and more persuasive when contrasted to false
ideas,318 understanding the fundamental flaws of modernist theories
sharpens our understanding of the force of the logic underlying the
traditionalist model. While its conclusion is largely identical to that
of the traditionalist model, it has considerably strengthened that
model in its careful and detailed response to the dangerous fallacies
of the modernists.
Perhaps the two classes of modernists do not recognize them-
selves as two sides of the same coin because they do not view
themselves as challenging the values that underlie the American
constitutional system, but only the devices used to effectuate those
values. But by examining modernist theories and uncovering their
basic inconsistency with the fundamental principles animating our
Constitution, premodernism rightly places both sets of scholars in
the same modernist box and identifies an additional indispensible
aspect of American constitutionalism. What through the lens of
traditionalism was a premise (that the American Constitution is
defined by countermajoritarian limitation on majoritarian govern-
ment powers) can be transformed into a reasoned conclusionthat
is, the fundamental components of the Constitution are thus its
writtenness and the provision of a prophylactic, insulated judiciary
to interpret it.
318. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 53 (Stefan Collini ed., 1989) (1859) ([E]ven if the
received opinion be ... the whole truth; unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously
and earnestly contested, it will ... be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little compre-
hension or feelings of its rational grounds.).
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Ultimately, premodern constitutionalism recognizes that struc-
ture is imbued with inherent meaning. Perhaps the American
Constitution could have been fashioned in unwritten form, and not
structured as it was. But it was written, and for good reason. The
fear of tyranny in Founding-era America permeated the four corners
of the document, and as a result the structural Constitution was
born. Shortly after winning a war to free the colonies from Britains
insufficiently representative rule, our fledgling nation enacted a sin-
gular, written Constitution that provided for a republican form of
government with majoritarian, representative branches structured
to impose a system of mutual checking and a prophylactically in-
dependent judiciary. The legislature would promulgate legislation,
the executive would execute it, and the judiciary would check the
danger that the majoritarian branches might tend toward tyranny.
To be sure, this judiciary itself was not built to be totally trusted
hence the structural choice to withhold all lawmaking and executive
authority from the judicial branch and to provide the accountable
branches with some level of control of judicial jurisdiction. But the
foundational assumption was that none of the branches could be
fully trusted, and judicial review was the best available option as
one element in the intricate checking process to which the Constitu-
tion gave rise.
IV. THE FUNDAMENTAL GAP BETWEEN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND UNWRITTEN OR INSUFFICIENTLY
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN CONSTITUTIONS
As we have demonstrated, constitutionalism as a general political
philosophy concerns the power systems and structures of govern-
mental ordering that organize societies and define the relationships
between governments and their governed. A state with constitutive
higher laws should not necessarily be characterized as a noncon-
stitutional nation just because those constitutive higher laws are
unwritten or unentrenched.319 It is, however, a nation with constitu-
tional priorities and concerns much different from our own, with a
set of constitutional mechanisms that might be well tailored to
319. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
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accomplish those priorities while being poorly tailored to accomp-
lish ours.
We have also explained why modernists are wrong to claim either
that the existence of a singular, written, positive supreme law or
the use of our judiciary as a countermajoritarian limitation on
majoritarian government is notor should not befundamental to
American constitutionalism.320 In this Part, we briefly examine con-
stitutions that lack in these particular qualities. We first discuss the
unwritten constitutional regimes in the United Kingdom, Israel,
and New Zealand in order to explain that while the unwritten, un-
entrenched constitutions these countries have chosen for themselves
may not be per se illegitimate, they are also not possessed of the
same structural guarantees that American constitutionalism en-
visions for a constitutional democracy. We then consider the
Chinese Constitution, which is contained in a singular written
statement of Chinas supreme law but which permits majoritarian
overpowering of any purported countermajoritarian checking it
might provide on paper.
The characteristics that are notably absent in these regimes
most importantly, in our view, documentary definiteness, a require-
ment that formal modification come only as a result of a super-
majoritarian process, and an effective apparatus for guaranteeing
countermajoritarian judicial revieware not mere technicalities or
American quirks. Instead, because these features are the tools em-
ployed to safeguard against the prospective tyrannies the Framers
so rightly feared, they are the fundamental elements of our struc-
tural Constitution, and quite probably the nations greatest contri-
bution to political thought.
A. Unwritten Constitutions
Constitutional governancein the broad sense of the phraseis
not unique to the United States. There are constitutional monar-
chies and dictatorships, sham constitutional regimes, and true
constitutional democracies strewn across the globe.321 Undoubtedly,
constitutional dictatorships and countries whose constitutions are
320. See supra Part III.
321. See, e.g., infra notes 322-60 and accompanying text.
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unenforced or fraudulent share little in common with American
constitutionalism, and to the extent that they purport to espouse
American values, they do so either disingenuously or half-heartedly.
But even some constitutional democracies, closer in kind to our
constitutional ideal, practice a significantly different form of consti-
tutionalism than ours because they often feature (1) unwritten
constitutions that provide for (2) parliamentary sovereignty or some
facsimile that permits majoritarian rule with little checking.
The United Kingdoms Constitution, for example, is unwritten in
any formal sense and based on custom, deriving from a wide range
of sources including not only conventions of ancient vintage, but also
acts of Parliament, treaties, common law, and European Union
law.322 The countrys democratic roots stretch at least as far back as
the Magna Carta of 1215, which professed a commitment to due
process and ordered liberty.323 Until the early seventeenth century,
power was split evenly in England between the monarchy, the
House of Lords, and the House of Commons.324 The checks and
balances of this system of separation of powers were often unfor-
givingly rigidin the early days of the kingdom, the parliament
deposed and executed five different English kingsbut never
featured judicial review as a method of enforcement against Parlia-
ment.325 The English Civil War of the 1640s (upon conclusion of
which yet another English king lost his head) and the Glorious
Revolution of the 1680s brought about immense change in En-
gland.326 But despite ebbs and flows in the quantum of authority
allocated each branch of the government, the basic structure of the
English state stayed somewhat constant.
Along the way, numerous statutes were passed that to this day
bear constitutional weight. The Petition of Right (1628) vested the
taxing power in the parliament;327 the Habeas Corpus Act (1679)
322. JOHN GARDNER, Can There Be a Written Constitution?, in LAW AS A LEAP OF FAITH:
ESSAYS ON LAW IN GENERAL 89, 90-91 (2012).
323. Id.
324. England is discussed separately because it is where the constitutional monarchy was
born; Great Britain, as a unified entity, came later. See infra note 330 and accompanying text.
325. See IAIN MCLEAN, WHATS WRONG WITH THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION? 20 (2d ed. 2012).
326. See John Phillip Reid, Another Origin of Judicial Review: The Constitutional Crisis
of 1776 and the Need for a Dernier Judge, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 963, 971-72 (1989).
327. See Elizabeth Read Foster, Petitions and the Petition of Right, 14 J. BRIT. STUD. 21, 45
(1974); J.A. Guy, The Origins of the Petition of Right Reconsidered, 25 HIST. J. 289, 298 (1982).
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provided for writs of habeas corpus in the courts;328 and the English
Bill of Rights (1689) set forth a number of rules and individual
rights of a Lockean tilt, including the right to petition the king with-
out retribution and the freedom from monarchical interference in
parliamentary elections.329 These laws formed the basis of the
English constitutional monarchy prior to unification in the eigh-
teenth century.
In 1707, the Act of Union fused Scotland, England, and Wales
into Great Britain.330 The Act marked the birth of the unitary state,
which centralized power in a British national government led by
the Parliament in Westminster and the monarchy, and which has
now defined British governmental structure for nearly 300 years.331
The laws set forth above and the Act of Union, together with the
Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949 (governing the means by which
legislation may be passed in either the House of Commons or a
combination of the House of Commons and the House of Lords), the
Human Rights Act of 1998 (incorporating the laws of the European
Convention on Human Rights), and the Equality Act of 2010 (the
British equivalent of Americas Civil Rights Act) are today consid-
ered the main framing documents of the British Constitution.332
The British courts are capable of determining the validity of
legislation in the United Kingdom as the principal arbiters of the
constitutional status of legislation in the UK.333 In a manner of
speaking, they serve a role resembling judicial review. But the
United Kingdom is fundamentally a political constitutional regime,
for the heart of the UK constitution is the doctrine of Parliamen-
tary Sovereignty.334 By design, the United Kingdom has placed
ultimate authority, both legislative and interpretive, in the peoples
328. See Helen A. Nutting, The Most Wholesome Law The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 65
AM. HIST. REV. 527, 529 (1960).
329. See Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Creation of a True Antient and Indubitable Right: The
English Bill of Rights and the Right to Be Armed, 32 J. BRIT. STUD. 226, 246 (1993).
330. See Richard Elliott, Iain McLean on Constitutionalism, Scottish Secession, and
Engagement with Political Theory: Do We Need a Codified Constitution for the (Rest of
the) United Kingdom?, OXPOL (Dec. 13, 2013), http://politicsinspires.org/iain-mclean-
constitutionalism-scottish-secession-engagement-political-theory-codified-constitution-rest-
united-kingdom/ [https://perma.cc/E7AU-FR49].
331. Id.
332. See GARDNER, supra note 322, at 90-91.
333. Id. at 94.
334. Id. at 95.
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representatives.335 Judicial review, and thus constitutional interpre-
tation, in the United Kingdom is, at its heart, majoritarian.336
Somewhat similarly, Israel features a constitutional democracy
with neither a comprehensive written constitution nor an entrench-
ed countermajoritarian judiciary. United Nations Resolution 181
established the State of Israel in 1948 and required the State to
promulgate a constitution that would include protections of basic
human rights.337 The Declaration of Independence of May 14, 1948
proposed that a Constituent Assembly should be elected to draft
and enshrine a singular written constitution.338 Within days, howev-
er, the country found itself under attack by its Arab neighbor states,
and the enactment of an Israeli constitution got lost in the shuffle.339
As a result, the Constituent Assembly merely adopted the Transi-
tion Law, deeming itself the States First Knesset, and failing in
its mission to craft a comprehensive written constitution.340
The Supreme Court of Israel was established in 1948 as well,
but was neither provided for by constitutional text nor enshrined in
any Basic Law until almost forty years later.341 Instead, the Su-
preme Court began as a remnant of British rule until, in 1957, the
Knesset replaced British Mandatory legislation with the Courts
Law, an ordinary statute, which dictated the maintenance of the ju-
dicial structure that had been implemented under British rule.342
Mirroring the British structure that existed before partition created
335. See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 37-41
(7th ed. 1908); see also RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: A REPUBLICAN
DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEMOCRACY 4-5 (2007) (defending parliamentary
sovereignty as normatively superior to legal constitutionalism due to the fact that it privileges
the voice of the people over the voices of unaccountable jurists).
336. GARDNER, supra note 322, at 95 ([T]he courts determine the legal effect of Acts of
Parliament but Parliament may always re-legislate to overrule the courts, subject again to
the courts determining the legal effects of the re-legislation. Parliament can always get its
way in the end by progressively more definite reiteration. Unless Parliament tires of the
process, the courts only get to postpone their own defeat.).
337. Yoseph M. Edrey, The Israeli Constitutional Revolution/Evolution, Models of Consti-
tutions, and a Lesson from Mistakes and Achievements, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 77, 78 (2005).
338. Id. at 80.
339. Mark Goldfeder, The State of Israels Constitution; A Comparison of Civilized Nations,
25 PACE INTL L. REV. 65, 69-70 (2013).
340. Id. at 80.
341. See Basic Law: The Judiciary, 5744-1984, SH No. II 10 p. 78 (Isr.).
342. DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL AND
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 10-11 (2002).
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the Jewish State, the original Israeli Supreme Court was designed
to act in two primary capacities: as the court of appeal for decisions
rendered in district courts and as the High Court of Justice.343 In
1984, the Knesset passed Basic Law: The Judiciary, officially
vesting the judicial power in the Supreme Court, district courts,
magistrate courts, and other courts designated by law as courts.344
Without a comprehensive written constitution and without any
higher law to dictate which rights the courts were devised to protect
or what comprised judicial power or its limitations, the judiciarys
status as enforcer or arbiter of constitutional law was initially du-
bious.345 Even the justices of the Israeli Supreme Court initially
expressed doubt that the judiciary was capable of engaging in
boundary setting through judicial review.346 It was not until the
Knesset, in 1992, narrowly passed two basic laws establishing a
code of individual rightsBasic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty
and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupationthat the Supreme Court
finally found its authority to review whether ordinary legislation
contravened Israeli higher law.347 Today the Court has the authority
to decide constitutional questions, but the degree to which judicial
review is available as a constitutional definition mechanism is
highly impacted by the courts nebulous understanding of Israeli
justiciablity doctrine.348
343. See Goldfeder, supra note 339, at 73.
344. Basic Law: The Judiciary, 5744-1984, SH No. II 10 p. 78 (Isr.).
345. To be sure, there were voices calling for judicial review. The earliest jurists on the
Israeli Supreme Court and the prominent scholarly voices in the Israeli legal community were
typically educated outside of Israel, often in central Europe. See KRETZMER, supra note 342,
at 4. Some of these jurists and scholars passionately called for the judiciary to defend individ-
ual liberties or quash legislative acts they deemed inconsistent with Israeli values. See, e.g.,
Edrey, supra note 337, at 83 (It is found that the loyalty to justice is superior to the loyalty
to such law, or more precisely the fidelity to the sacred principles of democracy and human
rights rejects the fidelity to oppressing laws of a tyrant legislature. (quoting Haim Cohen,
Meaningof the Triple Fiduciary of the Judiciary, 7 MISHPATIM 5, 8 (1976))).
346. Edrey, supra note 337, at 83 (Justice Bernzon indicated in the mid-1960s: I very
much doubt we have the authority to nullify the effectiveness of the law, or part of, if it has
been legislated by the Knesset in due process, even if it is clear to us that it contains a factual
error or it is based on a false assumption. (quoting HCJ 188/63 Bazul v. Minister of Interior
Affairs 19(1) PD 337 (1963) (Isr.))).
347. Id. at 85.
348. See Margit Cohn, Form, Formula and Constitutional Ethos: The Political Ques-
tion/Justiciability Doctrine in Three Common Law Systems, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 675, 699-700
(2011) (outlining Israels approach to justiciability and discussing the doctrines limiting
effects on judicial review).
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New Zealand is an even more curiously constructed constitutional
democracy. There, little effort has been made ... to determine which
legal instruments are part of its constitution and which are not.349
New Zealanders do not know what is and what is not their constitu-
tion; most constitutional interpretation is undertaken by public
officeholders, not the judiciary;350 and the regime is one of parlia-
mentary sovereignty, not popular sovereignty or judicial suprem-
acy.351 What is clear is that there is no written constitution in New
Zealand.352 The basic legal rule of our constitution is that parlia-
ment is supreme. When it passes legislation that is the law. There
is no higher law. There can be no argument that any statute parlia-
ment passed is unconstitutional.353
Nevertheless, New Zealanders view their courts as exert[ing] an
important checking function on the executive and on parliament.354
On rare occasions, New Zealands highest court has held the acts of
the prime minister to defy the word of either the old laws of the
British Parliament or the new laws of New Zealands Parliament,
and although enforcement of these decrees poses significant chal-
lenges, the people and the Parliament seem to accept the court
serving in this capacity.355 Ultimately, however, parliamentary sov-
ereignty severely limits the New Zealand Supreme Courts power to
check executive decisions and renders the court completely incapa-
ble of checking legislative decision making.356
Each of these countries has demonstrated, to some degree, its
commitment to individual rights and liberties. No one seriously
349. Palmer, supra note 118, at 609.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 619.
352. GEOFFREY PALMER, UNBRIDLED POWER?: AN INTERPRETATION OF NEW ZEALANDS
CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT 126 (1979) (Some existing elements [of our Constitution]
are in acts of parliament; others are not written down in any law. Indeed, some of the most
important points in our constitution depend upon customs known as conventions.).
353. Id. at 110.
354. Id. at 109.
355. See id. at 110-14 (describing the New Zealand Supreme Courts decision in Fitzgerald
v. Muldoon [1976] 2 NZLR 615 as demonstrating that the courts can be bold in checking the
excesses of executive power, and explaining that the case was an example of how the courts
can uphold fundamental principles).
356. Id. at 120 (The government can change any regulation at will. And it can amend
statutes with only a little more trouble. It is common in New Zealand for governments to react
swiftly and decisively against judicial decisions which are unacceptable to them.).
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suggests that the constitutional regimes in any of these countries
are illegitimate by virtue of their design or status.357 But in all of
these countries, constitutional democracy exists without a written
constitution and, ultimately, is subject to parliamentary supremacy.
This poses two problems with which American constitutionalism is
explicitly concerned. First, it treats government as though the gra-
dual or sudden onset of tyranny is of no concern. And second, even
if we assume that individual rights crises have not yet arisen in
these statesindeed, even if they never actually arisethis design
element allows for precisely the type of individual rights risk-
potential that American constitutionalism was uniquely devised to
eradicate. The foundational premise of American constitutionalism
is fear and mistrust,358 while the foundational premise of these sys-
tems seems to be faith in the pursuit of common purposes.
Take New Zealand as a most extreme example, where a diffuse
and unidentifiable constitution empowers majoritarian branches to
rule without any entrenched countermajoritarian check.359 New Zea-
land takes this approach because its constitutionalism is concerned
with building a large, unconstrained, benevolent government with
wide latitude to influence the citizenry. In the words of one com-
mentator:
In some other countries, notably the United States, people tend
to regard government as a necessary evil which should use and
be invested with powers to the most limited extent possible.
New Zealand, almost since its beginning, has never followed
that view. To the New Zealander, the government is his friend.360
It should be noted that the judiciary in the United Kingdom hears
cases and determines the validity of laws that jeopardize individual
rights or civil liberties.361 Both formally and descriptively, both the
357. Again, Israel is a unique case; we do not mean to suggest that no serious scholars or
political voices challenge the legitimacy of the Jewish State. We mean only to say that it is
a close question whether Israel espouses some form of constitutionalism or whether its
constitutionalism evinces some degree of commitment to fundamental rights.
358. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
359. PALMER, supra note 352, at 127 (At present we have no supreme law. Parliament can
pass any law without being subject to any higher law enshrined in a constitution.).
360. Id. at 6.
361. See supra note 333 and accompanying text; see also Po Jen Yap, The U.K. Supreme
Court at War, 24 WASH. INTL L.J. 363, 381 (2015) (discussing Gillan v. Commissioner of Police
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British judiciary and the European Court of Human Rights hold a
stronger position to check executive or legislative activity than does
the New Zealand Supreme Court.362 Formally, the laws that are
viewed as comprising the British Constitution are more numerous
and easier to identify than the norms and conventions that comprise
New Zealands. As a descriptive matter, the British judiciary might
enjoy enhanced credibility to enforce constitutional boundaries due
to its position in what looks like a federal structure.363 Professor
Delaney has written about the federalism facsimile that has rapidly
developed in the United Kingdom over the last few years, noting
that between the adoption of the European Convention of Human
Rights and the continued devolution of power to Scotland, the Brit-
ish Supreme Court has been positioned to enforce vertical power
boundaries.364 Building on earlier work suggesting that courts in a
federalist system empowered with enforcing vertical power bound-
aries can earn the legitimacy to enforce horizontal power bound-
aries,365 Professor Delaney argues that judicial supremacy might
well be on the rise in Great Britain.366
This descriptive explanation, however, does little to address the
underlying structural problem.367 Professor Delaney seems to think
that these new developments have strengthened the British judici-
ary such that it will soon be capable of enforcing horizontal power
boundaries and undermining parliamentary sovereignty.368 We are
not so sure. After all, the British Parliament is still very much
for the Metropolis & Anor [2006] UKHL 12, [2006] 2 AC 307 (HL), wherein the House of Lords
unanimously upheld Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which provided that a senior
police officer could authorize the use of blanket stop and search powers in certain situations).
362. See supra notes 333-36, 349-53 and accompanying text.
363. See Delaney, supra note 171, at 573-74.
364. See id.
365. See Barry Friedman & Erin F. Delaney, BecomingSupreme: The Federal Foundation
of Judicial Supremacy, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1142, 1193 (2011) (arguing that in the
United States, the Supreme Court earned credibility and legitimacy necessary to enforce hori-
zontal power boundaries thanks largely to the federalist structure that required the Court to
enforce vertical power boundaries).
366. Delaney, supra note 171, at 574.
367. Other prominent scholars who support and defend political constitutionalism and
parliamentary sovereignty think these developments pose little threat to Diceyan
constitutionalism in the United Kingdom. See ALISON L. YOUNG, PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGN-
TY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 68-72 (2009); Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism
and the Human Rights Act, 9 INTL J. CONST. L. 86, 87-88 (2011).
368. See Delaney, supra note 171, at 604-05.
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supreme, and the judiciary is still subject to parliamentary control.
But whether the court is poised to serve a stronger role is irrelevant
to the question of whether political constitutionalism can structur-
ally accommodate countermajoritarian checking. At any time, the
Parliament can impose its will in the United Kingdom because the
nations form of political constitutionalism permits such majoritari-
an course correction. In striking contrast, our Constitution has been
built explicitly to limit majoritarian power and permit counterma-
joritarian checking.
All three of these countries guarantee salary and tenure protec-
tions to supreme court justices.369 Or, we should say, they purport
to do so: majoritarian legislation secures these protections, and all
three of these countries could, by an act of ordinary legislative
power, repeal or amend the laws or norms that provide for insulated
judicial review.370 And all three of these countries can, by majoritari-
an choice, overrule judicial pronouncements without any fear of
reproach.371 In Israel, judicial review exists because the court
delegated itself that power when the Knesset legislated into effect
two basic laws relating to human rights and individual liberties;372
the Knesset remains empowered to disband the court, curb its
jurisdiction, redefine its purpose, or eviscerate the rights it codified
in the two basic laws that spawned the states judicial review doc-
trine.373
Whether these countries employ a legitimate form of constitu-
tional governance is therefore not the relevant question. Legitimacy
is a subjective concept; if the legitimacy of these regimes lies in how
well they effectuate the goal of recognizing the voice of the people,
369. See Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, §§ 33, 35 (granting life tenure to British
Supreme Court justices); Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act, 1993, c. 8, § 26 (creating
mandatory retirement at age seventy for British Supreme Court justices); Basic Law: The
Judiciary, 5744-1984 S.H. No. II 10 p. 78 (Isr.) (granting life tenure to Israeli Supreme Court
justices); The Judiciary: The Court System, ISR.MINISTRY FOREIGN AFFS., http://www.mfa.gov.
il/mfa/aboutisrael/state/democracy/pages/the%20judiciary-%20the%20court% 20system.aspx
[https://perma.cc/2YEY-XZHG] (last updated January 2015) (explaining that Israeli Supreme
Court justices have a mandatory retirement age of 70); Constitution Act 1986, s 23 (granting
life tenure to New Zealand Supreme Court justices).
370. See supra notes 335, 350-53 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 335, 350-53 and accompanying text.
372. See Myron J. Aronoff, The Americanization of Israeli Politics: Political and Cultural
Change, 5 ISR. STUD. 92, 92 (2000).
373. SUZIE NAVOT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ISRAEL 119 (2007).
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then it is difficult to challenge the legitimacy of political constitu-
tionalism because it quite effectively empowers the people to rule
based on the interests espoused by the majority of the governed. The
relevant question, in our view, is whether these unwritten political
constitutions are legitimate insofar as they advance the goals of
American constitutionalism; if they are not, then it seems perverse
to either claim our constitutional regime resembles them or draw
lessons for our constitutional system from them.
As we have made clear throughout this Article, the principal
concern of our founding document was to prevent majority rule from
railroading minority interests or jeopardizing future generations by
acting on momentary majoritarian choices. A system in which the
complete constitution is scattered, difficult to identify, and easily
subject to majoritarian modification or repeal cannot effectively
guarantee the peoples protection from the accumulation of power in
a tyrannical government. Political constitutionalism offers to secure
minority interests by crossing its fingers and hoping the political
realities that make infringement unlikely will continue to morally
tie the governments hands indefinitely. This is directly contradic-
tory to our legal constitutionalisms formal methods of enshrining
the protection of minority rights through a countermajoritarian
check contained in a comprehensive statement of supreme law.
B. Insufficiently Countermajoritarian Constitutions
Although the dangers inherent in the unwritten constitutions of
political constitutionalist regimes are subtle and creeping, the perils
of pure, unadulterated majoritarianism are clear on their face. The
validity of the premodern view of American constitutionalism and
the absurdity of modernism are obvious when one examines regimes
that plainly adopt either pure majoritarianism or toothless counter-
majoritarian judicial review. China is one such nation, and a brief
examination of its mode of judicial review further bolsters our pre-
modernist claim that the core of American constitutionalism is
countermajoritarian checking of majoritarian power, manifested
through a singular written constitution and a prophylactically in-
sulated judiciary empowered as final constitutional interpreter.
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Early constitutional development in China began in the latter
half of the nineteenth century.374 Throughout the entirety of its con-
stitutional history, the Chinese Constitution has existed in a state
of tumult. Since 1908, China has deemed itself governed by a series
of twelve different constitutions.375 But despite having a written
constitution in some format for over a century, Chinas Constitution
does not provide for countermajoritarian checking in any form,
either by separation of powers, federalism, or prophylactic judicial
review. Indeed, the Supreme Peoples Court is not the ultimate
arbiter of the constitutionality of legislation.376 In the words of one
commentator:
Political rights were guaranteed under the Chinese constitutions
to all citizens aged eighteen and over as the right to vote and
stand for election. ... Under the current 1982 Constitution, the
right to strike contained in the 1975 and 1978 Constitutions was
... eliminated.
Moreover, those civil and political rights formally guaranteed
were subject to a number of crucial limitations that effectively
undermined the guarantee. First, like other communist coun-
tries, China was a state operating according to concepts of civil
law that saw law itself as based on the will of the state and the
legislative provisions made by it. Since the Constitution was not
judicially actionable, the state was not obliged to put the guaran-
teed rights into action. Second, the socialist emphasis on the
supremacy of the state over the individual strengthened the
existing historical bias toward the dependence of the individual
on the state for rights, the view of law as an instrument of the
state, the emphasis on a citizens responsibility to the state
rather than on his rights, and the view of human rights as a
matter of domestic jurisdiction as well as a potential threat to
state sovereignty.
....
...[As] of 1989, the informal condition of liberalization did not
have any corresponding support in the existing constitutional,
374. See JINSONG JIANG, THE NATIONAL PEOPLES CONGRESS OF CHINA 18-19 (2003); M.
Ulric Killion, Chinas Amended Constitution: Quest for Liberty and Independent Judicial
Review, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 43, 45 (2005).
375. Killion, supra note 374, at 51-52.
376. Tahirih V. Lee, ExportingJudicial Review from the United States to China, 19 COLUM.
J. ASIAN L. 152, 160 (2005).
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legal, and institutional framework.... As in the past, freedoms
were still granted, or rescinded, at the whim of the state.377
In fact, under Chinese law, only the National Peoples Congress
possesses authority to interpret the Constitution.378 The courts in
China are forbidden from invalidating statutes, and have no au-
thority to define the bounds of their own jurisdiction.379 And, most
importantly of all,
Chinese courts issue their rulings under the supervision of
government officials.... [I]ntense supervision of the courts by
other political institutions is a hallmark of the Chinese legal
system. In the name of supervision, legislatures intervene in
the judicial process at their respective administrative levels.
Courts do not review any issue without guidance from the
Chinese Communist Party, but are guided toward their deci-
sions, particularly in deciding cases deemed as complex or
big, by adjudication committees staffed by Party personnel at
each court. Supervision by the adjudication committees is
justified as a check on judges by the masses.380
As a matter of common sense, this constitutional regime should
appear to us as diametrically opposed to our own. Without an in-
sulated judiciary that can effectively activate a countermajoritarian
check, the Chinese system hardly resembles the American system.
Businesses and individuals cannot ensure that their economic381 and
liberty382 interests will be secure against infringement, and the
bounds of governmental power can change at the whim of the ruling
party. The skeptical optimism at the heart of our constitutionalism
is nowhere to be found in Chinas: their unchecked majoritarian
377. ANN KENT, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE LIMITS OF
COMPLIANCE 29-31 (1999) (footnote omitted).
378. Lee, supra note 376, at 161.
379. Id. at 165.
380. Id. at 166.
381. See, e.g., Youngjin Jung & Qian Hao, The New Economic Constitution in China: A
Third Way for Competition Regime?, 24 NW. J. INTL L. & BUS. 107, 108-09 (2003) (explaining
that the weak judiciary renders antitrust enforcement meaningless and thus discourages
competition and new entry into Chinas capital markets).
382. See, e.g., KENT, supra note 377, at 30; Katie Hunt & Shen Lu, Fighting for Their
Rights Landed These YoungChinese Feminists in Jail, CNN (Apr. 10, 2015, 3:57 PM), http://
www.cnn.com/2015/04/10/asia/china-five-women-activists/ [https://perma.cc/Z9HJ-KK2V].
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regime undercuts the human capacity for flourishing and permits
government overreach.
This is why the premodernist analysis is really the only way to
adequately conceptualize American constitutionalism: if the mod-
ernists are correct that the principles of American constitutionalism
can be achieved even without their necessary activating devices, the
forms of constitutionalism examined in this Part logically contain
transferable lessons about our own related constitutionalism. If
American constitutionalism is not defined in part by the activating
device of a singular, entrenched, written constitution, then the un-
written political constitutions of England, Israel, and New Zealand
are essentially cousin constitutionalisms to our own despite the
inherent structural deficiencies that render these countries inca-
pable of guaranteeing individual liberties. Likewise, if American
constitutionalism is not partly defined by the activating device of a
prophylactic, insulated judiciary, then the unchecked majoritarian
Constitution of China is not so different from our own. The power of
the premodernist view is its descriptive power to theorize the gut
reaction that anyone remotely familiar with the American Consti-
tution and the principles it seeks to protect would be sure to exhibit
in the face of such comparisons.
CONCLUSION
It has been suggested that America has no ideology whatsoever,
that pragmatism is this countrys guiding principle.383 When
Madison was chastised for refusing to design a federal government
whose branches were completely separated as Montesquieu had ad-
vised, his response was pragmatic: a system of checks and balances
was more important than maintaining complete separation.384 But
this rolled-up sleeves American pragmatism is appropriately viewed
as an ideology in itself. It represents first the cold, hard, street-
wise recognition of the danger of accumulated and unchecked
power, and second, a belief in the power of a written, entrenched
document to both empower the majority and protect that majority
383. See generally DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE
(1973); HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN MIND (1950).
384. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 20 (James Madison).
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from itself. ConstitutionalismAmerican constitutionalismis this
countrys great contribution to political thought, borne not out of the
postulates of theorists but out of the depths of necessity, the mother
of invention. We risk modifying or reshaping itparticularly in the
ways suggested by the modernistsat our peril.
